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UNIFYING ORIGINAL INTENT AND  
ORIGINAL PUBLIC MEANING 
John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport 
ABSTRACT—Original intent and original public meaning are generally 
thought to be opposing camps within originalism. Both theories assert that 
that the meaning of a constitutional provision was fixed at the time it was 
enacted. But they disagree fundamentally on the nature of interpretation. 
Original intent asserts that the meaning sought is that intended by the 
Constitution’s enactors. Original public meaning asserts that the meaning 
sought is that revealed by the text as reasonably understood by a well-
informed reader at the time of the provision’s enactment. 
In this Essay, we unite these two conflicting principles of originalism 
under the original methods approach to constitutional interpretation, thereby 
providing a single coherent foundation for originalism. Under original 
methods, the Constitution is interpreted using the conventional legal 
interpretive rules deemed applicable to a document of its type at the time it 
was enacted. As properly understood, both the original intent and original 
public meaning approaches mandate that the Constitution be interpreted 
using the same conventional interpretive rules. Under original public 
meaning, a reasonable and knowledgeable person at the time would interpret 
the constitutional text by using the rules that were then thought to apply to 
it. Under original intent, the enactors would have intended the Constitution 
to be interpreted based on the conventional interpretive rules applied to it at 
that time. 
We further argue that these interpretive rules should be identified using 
the methods that people at the time would have employed for determining 
the interpretive rules. Just as constitutional provisions should be interpreted 
using the interpretive rules employed at the time of the relevant provision’s 
enactment, so too should the interpretive rules be identified based on the 
methods employed to identify those interpretive rules. We illustrate our 
approach by exploring the controversy of the Bank of the United States, 
showing, for instance, that there was a consensus against use of the 
substantive intent of the Philadelphia Convention as an interpretive rule. 
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[W]hatever may have been the intentions of the framers of a 
constitution, or of a law, that intention is to be sought for in the 





 † Opinion of Alexander Hamilton, on the Constitutionality of a National Bank (Feb. 23, 1791), in 
LEGISLATIVE AND DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 95, 101 (M. St. Clair 
Clarke & D. A. Hall eds., Augustus M. Kelley 1967) (1832). 
113:1371 (2019) Unifying Original Intent and Original Public Meaning 
1373 
INTRODUCTION 
Original intent and original public meaning remain the opposite poles 
of originalism. While both theories share the view that the meaning of a 
constitutional provision was fixed at the time it was enacted, they diverge 
sharply on the object of interpretation. Original intent asserts that this object 
is the intended meaning of the Constitution’s enactors.1 In other words, it is 
the intentions of the enactors that are key to interpreting the Constitution. 
Original public meaning posits that the object of interpretation is the text as 
reasonably understood by a well-informed reader at the time of the 
provision’s enactment.2 In other words, it is the text, not the intentions of the 
enactors, that is key to interpretation. Thus, originalism appears to have two 
conflicting interpretive foundations. 
In this Essay, we argue that these two approaches can be unified under 
the original methods approach to constitutional interpretation, thereby 
providing a single coherent foundation for originalism. Under original 
methods, the Constitution is interpreted using the conventional legal 
interpretive rules that would have been deemed applicable to a document of 
its type at the time it was enacted. We maintain that both the original intent 
and original public meaning approaches, when properly understood through 
the lens of original methods, require that the Constitution be interpreted 
using the same conventional interpretive rules. In the course of this Essay, 
we also sketch how to determine these conventional rules and illustrate our 
approach by exploring the controversy of the Bank of the United States. 
We advance three interrelated claims. The first Part describes—through 
our original methods approach—the convergence of original intent and 
original public meaning. An original public meaning approach would use the 
conventionally applicable legal interpretive rules to interpret the 
Constitution. After all, a reasonable and knowledgeable person at the time 
would interpret the Constitution by using the interpretive rules that were then 
thought to apply to it. An original intent approach would also use those same 
conventional interpretive rules. While it might be thought that the original 
intent approach requires that interpreters look to the intentions of the 
constitutional enactors to determine the meaning of particular terms, that 
claim is not true. If one asked the constitutional enactors—either the drafters 
or the ratifiers—whether one should consider their subjective intentions 
 
 1 See, e.g., Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: 
Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226, 230 (1988). 
 2 See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF 
LIBERTY 92 (2004) (“‘[O]riginal [public] meaning’ originalism seeks the public or objective meaning that 
a reasonable listener would place on the words used in the constitutional provision at the time of its 
enactment.”). 
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when interpreting the Constitution, they would have rejected this approach. 
Instead, they would have said that the Constitution should be interpreted 
based on the conventional interpretive rules that were applied to it at that 
time.3 Thus, the enactors would have an interpretive intent—an intent about 
how the Constitution should be interpreted. In this Essay, we offer both 
reasons why the enactors would have had an interpretive intent and evidence 
that they in fact did have that intent. 
The second Part sketches how to determine which interpretive rules 
were applicable to the Constitution at its ratification. We argue that the 
interpretive rules should be identified using the methods that would have 
been employed at the time for determining the interpretive rules. By using 
the methods that were employed then, we determine the interpretive rules in 
the same way the enactors would have. We call these methods the meta rules 
to distinguish them from the interpretive rules they identify. We argue that 
one of the main meta rules used for identifying the interpretive rules would 
have likely been the common law method.4 
One might fear that a dispute could arise about the meta rules: just as 
the original intent and original public meaning approaches interpret the 
Constitution differently, there might be competing meta rules. Original intent 
advocates might determine the interpretive rules by asking what rules the 
enactors intended. By contrast, original public meaning advocates might 
determine these rules by asking what a reasonable observer would have 
thought those rules to be—what we call the reasonable import method. Thus, 
the interpretive process might seem to be stuck at an impasse.5 But that 
potential impasse can be resolved because both the original intent and the 
reasonable import approaches embrace the same method for determining the 
interpretive rules—asking what conventional interpretive rules a reasonable 
observer would have deemed applicable to the Constitution. Thus, both the 
reasonable import and the original intent approaches lead to applying the 
same conventional interpretive rules. 
 
 3 See infra Sections I.C, III.A. In this Essay we often refer to “the conventional interpretive rules” as 
a shorthand. In general, we are referring to the existing legal interpretive rules that were used to interpret 
legal documents at the time. As we argue below, we believe the conventional interpretive rules deemed 
applicable to the Federal Constitution were generally those applicable to statutes and state constitutions 
at the time. But see infra Section II.C (acknowledging that it is possible that a new interpretive rule in a 
few instances might have been deemed applicable to the Constitution).   
 4 Under the common law, one would look to the existing interpretive rules and other factors to 
determine what to apply. We describe this method of reasoning below. See infra Section II.C.1. 
 5 Thus, for instance, an original intent approach to interpretive rules might privilege evidence about 
the interpretive rules provided by the enactors. A reasonable import approach, on the other hand, would 
consider evidence about the interpretive rules more generally from legal practice at the time. 
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This Part also sketches how the interpretive rules for the Constitution 
emerged. We argue that the rules derived from the common law interpretive 
rules applied to statutes in the eighteenth-century Anglo-American legal 
system. Those rules were then applied to the state constitutions and 
ultimately to the Constitution. While those statutory interpretive rules were 
generally applied to the Constitution, the content of the rules may have been 
modified a bit when applied to the Constitution. The method for modifying 
the rules would have been determined based on the common law methods at 
the time. 
The last Part considers the debate about the constitutionality of the Bank 
of the United States to illustrate how to investigate questions about the 
content of the legal interpretive rules. We show that there was general 
agreement that the Constitution should be interpreted according to 
conventional interpretive rules and substantial agreement on the content of 
these rules. Significantly, there was little, if any, evidence that the rules 
required or allowed using the subjective intent of the drafters or ratifiers to 
determine the meaning of constitutional provisions. But in certain limited 
circumstances decisions of a ratifying convention as a whole could be 
understood to be an early exposition of constitutional meaning and thus be 
entitled to some interpretive weight under a conventional interpretive rule 
applicable at the time. 
I. THE CONVERGENCE OF THE ORIGINAL INTENT AND ORIGINAL PUBLIC 
MEANING APPROACHES UNDER ORIGINAL METHODS ORIGINALISM 
A. The Different Versions of Original Methods 
The basic idea of original methods originalism is that determining the 
original meaning of the Constitution requires the application of not merely 
the original word meanings and grammar of the constitutional language, but 
also of the interpretive rules deemed applicable to the Constitution at the 
time of its enactment.6 
The justification for this approach is that the authors and readers of the 
language would have invoked the interpretive rules when determining the 
meaning of the language they were producing and reading.7 It is not simply 
that the enactors and readers would have assumed that these interpretive 
rules would have been employed, but that they would have believed that 
applying those rules was the correct way to determine the meaning of the 
document. Consequently, the failure to apply those interpretive rules would 
 
 6 See JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD CONSTITUTION 
121 (2013). 
 7 Id. 
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lead to an inaccurate interpretation, arriving at a different meaning than the 
enactors and readers of the document would have believed the words 
produced. 
While application of the interpretive rules under the original methods 
approach is an essential part of determining the original meaning, we do not 
consider original methods to be an independent or stand-alone theory of 
interpretation. Instead, we understand original methods as being an essential 
component of the principal originalist interpretive theories: the original 
intent and original public meaning approaches. 
Thus, there are two versions of original methods originalism: an 
original intent version and an original public meaning version. While both 
versions require the interpreter to apply the original interpretive rules, 
nothing guarantees that the two versions will have precisely the same 
content. For example, the interpretive rules that the enactors intended may 
be different than the interpretive rules that a reasonable and knowledgeable 
observer would have applied. 
Nonetheless, we believe it is likely that the two versions have the same 
content—in which case original methods will have unified the two leading 
approaches to originalism. Even if the two versions do not have exactly the 
same content, the requirement that both the original intent and the original 
public meaning approach apply the conventional interpretive rules makes it 
more likely that they will have similar content. In the next two Sections, we 
present the arguments for why the original intent approach and the original 
public meaning approach require that the Constitution be interpreted in 
accordance with the same original interpretive rules. 
B. Original Public Meaning 
1. The Basic Public Meaning Approach 
The original public meaning approach posits that the Constitution 
should be interpreted based not on the intent of its authors or enactors but on 
the original public meaning of the language.8 The original public meaning is 
normally thought to be the meaning that a knowledgeable and reasonable 
interpreter would have placed on the words at the time that the document 
was written.9 This approach, then, focuses not on the subjective intent of the 
writers, but on the way that the words would have been understood by people 
at the time. For this reason, original public meaning is often thought to be 
 
 8 See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 2. 
 9 See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 47, 
75–76 (2006). 
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associated with textualism,10 in contrast to original intent, which is associated 
with intentionalism.11 
Original public meaning, however, would require that the language be 
interpreted not merely based on word meanings, but also based on the 
interpretive rules deemed applicable to that language and type of document. 
A reasonable and knowledgeable interpreter would make use of the 
interpretive rules that were deemed applicable—it would hardly be 
reasonable to ignore the rules that were supposed to be applied to the 
language of a particular type of document. Thus, if the rule against 
surplusage were applicable at the time of the Constitution’s enactment, it 
should be applied to prefer interpretations that did not make provisions or 
words of the Constitution redundant. 
While the original public meaning approach is sometimes thought to 
require that the ordinary meaning of the language be followed, that is not 
necessarily true. Sometimes a reasonable interpreter would be acting 
unreasonably in assuming that the meaning of a document was that which an 
ordinary reader would ascribe to it. For instance, while a surgeon’s report 
has a public meaning, that meaning does not reflect the ordinary meaning of 
the words, but the technical meaning used and understood by medical 
professionals. The report’s meaning might also reflect conventions of 
surgical reports, like the prioritization of facts and the placement of terms. 
The Constitution is not written in ordinary language, but in the language 
of the law.12 As a result, the legal interpretive rules—conventions unique to 
the legal profession—become important to determine its meaning. Just as 
legal terms would be fixed based on their legal meaning at the time of 
enactment, so too would legal interpretive rules be ascertained by evidence 
of their use in the legal community at that time. These rules include not only 
legally substantive rules, like the rule of lenity, but also rules about 
interpretation, like the relevance of purpose to determining the meaning of 
ambiguous terms.13 Hence our view is that the original methods of 
interpretation lay the foundation of original public meaning. 
We have previously explained our view that the Constitution is written 
in the language of the law and therefore determining its original public 
 
 10 See Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 630 (1999) 
(originalism motivated by the same considerations as textualism). 
 11 See David Lyons, Original Intent and Legal Interpretation, 24 AUSTL. J. LEGAL PHIL. 1, 1 (1999) 
(viewing original intent interpretation of the Constitution as a variant of general philosophy of  
following intent). 
 12 For full discussion of this position, see John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The 
Constitution and the Language of the Law, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1321 (2018). 
 13 Id. at 1340–41. 
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meaning requires reference to legal interpretive rules.14 Thus, here we merely 
summarize our argument. In making our argument, we offer two ways of 
conceptualizing that the Constitution is written in the language of the law. 
Under the first, we view language broadly as including word meanings, 
syntax, and interpretive rules. Under the second, we view language more 
narrowly, as including only word meanings and syntax, with the interpretive 
rules conceived of as part of the context. Under either view, the original legal 
interpretive rules are needed to determine the original public meaning of the 
Constitution. We then briefly review the overwhelming evidence that the 
Constitution is written in the language of the law, which includes the legal 
interpretive rules. 
2. The Analogy to Word Meanings and Grammatical Rules 
Original methods originalism posits that the original public meaning 
approach should be to interpret the Constitution using the interpretive rules 
that would have been applicable to it.15 One reason why the original methods 
approach follows the interpretive rules is that the interpretive rules can be 
thought of as part of the language in which the Constitution is written. Just 
as language includes word meanings and grammatical rules, it might also be 
understood to include the interpretive rules that would have been deemed 
applicable to the Constitution. In all three cases, language users would follow 
certain rules and conventions in expressing themselves. Thus, these 
interpretive rules have the same status within an original public meaning 
approach as the word meanings and grammatical rules. And if the document 
is written in the language of the law, these interpretive rules would include 
legal interpretive rules. 
Consider an important interpretive rule governing language in formal 
documents: the rule against surplusage. This rule holds that one should prefer 
an interpretation that reads a passage so that none of its language is rendered 
redundant.16 This interpretive rule probably had its basis in the fact that 
authors of formal documents tend to eliminate surplusage, and therefore, 
interpreting language to be surplusage is less likely to be the correct 
interpretation. But the rule in legal documents is not just a generalization, it 
is a legal interpretive rule that requires the interpreter to give additional 
weight to the interpretation that does not render language surplusage—a rule 
that is constitutive of meaning within the public meaning approach.17 
 
 14 See id. at 1341–44. 
 15 MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 6, at 123–26. 
 16 Id. at 119. 
 17 For a discussion of the significance of the surplusage canon, see ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. 
GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 174–79 (2012). 
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The rule against surplusage is an example of a legal interpretive rule 
with origins in ordinary language usage, but that is applied more strictly in 
the language of the law. But the language of the law also includes legal 
interpretive rules—like the rule of lenity18—which have no clear counterpart 
in ordinary language. In addition, the language of the law includes legal 
interpretive rules that specify aspects of the interpretive process. For 
example, these legal interpretive rules may indicate what kind of evidence is 
relevant to interpretation and what quantum of evidence is needed to choose 
one interpretation over another.19 Overall, the distinctive legal interpretive 
rules developed for a variety of reasons, including the need for greater 
precision in law than in the communication of ordinary life. 
3. The Argument from Legal Context 
One argument against our claim that the interpretive rules are part of 
language is that language should be understood more narrowly as including 
only semantics and syntax. If that were true, then the interpretive rules, 
which are largely neither semantics nor syntax, would not be part of the 
language. But even if the interpretive rules are not part of language, they still 
would properly contribute to the meaning of the Constitution because they 
are part of the context of the Constitution’s language. The branch of the 
philosophy of language called pragmatics is devoted to the subject of how 
context contributes to meaning.20 The contribution that context makes to 
meaning is known as pragmatic enrichment or contextual enrichment.21 
Often the literal or semantic meaning will have one meaning, but the words 
employed by the speaker in context have a different meaning once 
contextually enriched. And that meaning is recognized by both the speaker 
and the hearer. 
As we describe elsewhere, the context of a legal document includes the 
legal interpretive rules that governed legal interpretation when it was 
written.22 First, when lawyers write formal documents in the language of the 
 
 18 See 3 NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 59.3, at 125–47 (6th ed. 
2001). 
 19 An example is the standard for invoking the absurdity rule, the canon that justifies disregarding 
the text to avoid absurd results. See 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 427, at 326 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., 5th ed. 1891) (“[I]f in any case the plain meaning 
of a provision, not contradicted by any other provision in the same instrument, is to be disregarded 
because we believe the framers of that instrument could not intend what they say, it must be one where 
the absurdity and injustice of applying the provision to the case would be so monstrous that all mankind 
would, without hesitation, unite in rejecting the application.”) (emphasis added). 
 20 See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Intellectual History as Constitutional Theory, 101 VA. L. REV. 
1111, 1126 (2015). 
 21 Id. at 1128. 
 22 McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 12, at 1350–53. 
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law, they apply the relevant legal interpretive rules to the document.23 
Second, the practice of lawyers considering the actual legal interpretive 
rules, rather than the interpretive rules known by parties to a communication, 
helps decrease the uncertainty that is inherent in communications between 
multiple authors and readers.24 As a result, the legal context includes all the 
actual legal interpretive rules. 
4. Evidence for the Constitution’s Language of the Law 
The language of the law is one of many technical languages, including 
the languages of medicine and psychology. Lawyers are taught to use the 
language of the law at law school and use it unselfconsciously in practice.25 
It is not surprising that it includes more exact terms and more rules that aid 
precision than ordinary language. Law needs more precision and had 
centuries to devise ways of achieving it.26 
Elsewhere we have shown the overwhelming evidence that the original 
Constitution is written in the language of the law.27 The evidence begins with 
the Constitution’s self-declaration: the Supremacy Clause proclaims that the 
Constitution is law.28 But even more important is the pervasiveness of legal 
terms in the Constitution. In our review we found over a hundred uses of 
terms with a legal meaning. Some of them—like “Bill of Attainder”—clearly 
have a legal meaning, while others—like “due process”—have both a legal 
and ordinary meaning.29 All these terms put the reader on notice that the 
document is a legal one. And once on notice, a reasonable interpreter must 
take account of numerous uses of other terms, like “legislative Powers,” that 
might have a legal meaning. 
The Constitution also implicitly references various legal interpretative 
rules. The non obstante clause in the Supremacy Clause appears clearly to 
assume existence of common law interpretive rules.30 The Constitution also 
includes phrases like preambles and prefatory clauses for which there were 
established rules of legal interpretation.31 The Bill of Rights, no less than the 
 
 23 See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 113 (2001) 
(noting that relevant interpretative rules are applied by any reasonably diligent lawyer when  
examining a statute). 
 24 McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 12, at 1352. 
 25 See, e.g., PAUL W. KAHN, MAKING THE CASE: THE ART OF THE JUDICIAL OPINION, at x–xi (2016). 
 26 Cf. David A. Skeel, Jr., Lawrence Joseph and Law and Literature, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 921, 930 
(2009) (noting that legal prose, unlike much literary prose, “aims for concision and clarity”). 
 27 McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 12, at 1368–77. 
 28 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see also McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 12, at 1369. 
 29 McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 12, at 1370–77. 
 30 Id. at 1378–81. The non obstante clause in the Supremacy Clause provides that “any Thing in the 
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 31 McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 12, at 1381–83. 
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original Constitution, contains many legal terms, as well as phrases that play 
off legal interpretive rules.32 
Finally, in the Early Republic, both those who were experts in the 
language of the law, such as jurists, and those who were not necessarily 
experts, such as legislators, interpreted the Constitution by references to a 
wide variety of legal interpretative rules.33 We have shown that such rules 
include the antisurplusage rule, as discussed above, the expressio unius rule, 
which states that when one or more things of a class are expressly 
mentioned, others of the same class are excluded,34 and the rule of lenity, 
which requires that ambiguity in the criminal law be resolved in the 
defendant’s favor.35 
5. Knowledge of the Interpretive Rules 
An objection to our argument is that authors or readers would need to 
know all these legal interpretive rules, but such knowledge would not be 
necessary for the legal interpretive rules to contribute to the Constitution’s 
meaning.36 Certainly, the language of the law needed to exist, and it would 
be helpful if some of the authors and readers possessed a general knowledge 
of its existence, which is what our evidence shows. But they did not have to 
know all the particular rules. The nominal authors of legal documents, such 
as wills or powers of attorney, frequently did not understand all the legal 
nuances of the documents issued in their names because they were not fluent 
in the language of the law.37 The authors and readers no more needed to know 
all the legal interpretive rules than they needed to know the meaning of all 
the legal terms, such as “letters of marque and reprisal.”38 
 
 32 Id. at 1376–77, 1380. 
 33 Id. at 1383–96. 
 34 For a description of the canon, see SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 17, at 107–11. 
 35 Id. at 296–302. Other interpretive rules that were applied in the Early Republic include the rule 
that the specification of particulars is the exclusion of generals, the negative pregnant rule, the rule that 
unclear provisions should be interpreted in accord with their purpose, the rule that terms may be given a 
meaning based on historical practice, the rule of intratextualism, the rule that an interpreter should 
consider both the letter and the spirit of a provision, the rule that the interpretation of a document should 
accord with the nature of the document, and the rule that provisions should be interpreted in accord with 
legal maxims, such as no man should benefit from his own wrong. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 
12, at 1395–96. 
 36 Some scholars, however, claim otherwise. See Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and 
Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 510 (2013) (“[Original methods] theory assumes 
that the authors of the relevant constitutional texts were aware of the original methods and hence that they 
could deploy the original methods to create communicative content.”). 
 37 One of the principal skills taught in law school is to think like a lawyer, which requires reading 
texts as a lawyer would. See ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING TO “THINK 
LIKE A LAWYER” 97 (2007). 
 38 See infra notes 39–40 and accompanying text. 
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Even those who were generally familiar with the language of the law 
may not know all the legal interpretive rules, just as those generally familiar 
with a natural language might not know the meaning of all its words or 
grammatical rules. Similarly, lawyers consult cases and treatises to find 
relevant interpretive rules and the meaning of technical terms, just as users 
of natural languages consult dictionaries and other people to pin down the 
meaning of expressions with which they are unfamiliar.39 While every rule 
is known by some subset of people, many rules are not known by everyone 
who speaks the language, whether the language is ordinary or technical.40 
Legal documents are produced, interpreted, and read under conditions 
conducive to deliberation, allowing lawyers to ponder the writing, look up 
unfamiliar matters, and consult experts. 
We certainly agree that the meaning of the legal interpretive rules must 
have been publicly available. But in a language of substantial complexity, no 
one person knows everything about the language that can be ascertained 
through publicly available methods. A complex language can convey 
meaning through all its terms and rules, even if no one person knows all of 
them, which is part of its utility and beauty. 
C. Original Intent 
As the original public meaning approach should rely on the 
conventional interpretive rules to determine the meaning of constitutional 
text, so too should the original intent approach be understood to refer to an 
intent to apply the conventional interpretive rules. This Section first explains 
original intent methodology and explores its limitations if it is understood to 
require an inquiry into substantive intent—that is, the intent that the enactors 
had about the meaning of substantive constitutional provisions. It then 
suggests that many of these problems are resolved if original intent refers to 
an interpretive intent—that is, an intent simply to follow the conventional 
interpretative rules. 
1. Problems with Original Intent 
The original intent approach posits that the meaning of a constitutional 
provision is the meaning intended by the enactors of the provision. While 
commentators are not always clear about the precise intent that is relevant, 
the strongest view is that the original intent is the intended meaning of a 
provision rather than the results that the authors hoped the provision would 
 
 39 Robert G. Natelson, The Legal Meaning of “Commerce” in the Commerce Clause, 80 ST. JOHN’S 
L. REV. 789, 817 (2006) (“When faced with a problematic word in a legal document today, the lawyer’s 
first instinct often is to consult a legal dictionary.”). 
 40 Cf. Manning, supra note 23, at 109. 
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produce. As Professor Larry Alexander puts it, it is the uptake that an author 
intends the audience to derive from his words.41 
The original intent approach is most plausible when it involves a single 
author or speaker. In these situations, we are often interested in what the 
author intended to communicate, and there may be a clear answer to the 
question.42 But the original intent approach becomes less plausible in 
communications jointly authored by a group. In this situation, it confronts 
the problem of aggregating the different intents of the law’s enactors. 
If some members of the lawmaking body intended a constitutional 
provision to have meaning A, while others intended it to have meaning B, 
and still others intended it to have meaning C, then what is the meaning of 
the provision? The need to aggregate intents involves at least three distinct 
problems.43 
The first problem lies in determining the requisite consensus to 
determine a group’s intent—should a majority, supermajority, or even 
unanimous agreement be the requisite consensus? The justification for the 
majority requirement is that when a group acts, a majority is necessary to 
resolve disagreements. Majority rule ensures that the meaning held by the 
larger number is followed. While this argument has some force, an important 
objection is that a majority may be insufficient to adequately capture the 
intent of the body. If a large minority had a different intent, then one might 
doubt that the majority intent really represented the body as a whole. 
An alternative approach responding to this criticism is that a relatively 
stringent supermajority rule is needed to determine the group’s intent. A 
supermajority rule assures that only a relatively small percentage of the body 
does not share the intent. While unanimity as to intent might be ideal, that 
ideal is rarely achieved or demanded by political institutions and thus can 
probably be eliminated as a serious option to resolve this problem. 
The second problem arises upon a failure to attain the required 
consensus of intent. If a constitutional enactment (or a bill) does not 
command sufficient agreement, the enactment would be invalid. If a 
supermajority were required, but only a majority agreed on their intent (or a 
 
 41 Larry Alexander, Originalism, the Why and the What, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 539, 540 (2013). 
 42 Yet, even in this area of strength, the original intent approach has problems. Consider situations 
where the speaker misspeaks. Imagine that a speaker says, “I put the paper on the dresser,” when the 
speaker meant to say that he put it on the “table.” What is the meaning of the statement? It seems clear 
that it means that the paper was placed on the dresser, even though the speaker intended to say table. 
What the speaker meant to say was different from what he actually said. Yet, it would seem that the 
original intent approach would analyze the meaning of this statement in terms of the dresser, rather than 
the table, because that is what the speaker intended the hearer to understand by it. 
 43 Some of these problems were first presented by Paul Brest. See Paul Brest, The Misconceived 
Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980). 
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majority were required, but only a plurality agreed), then the provision would 
not be enacted, even though the provision would have received the requisite 
number of votes to pass. We know of no case in the history of Anglo-
American law where a constitutional (or statutory) provision was held not to 
have been passed, even though it received the requisite proportion of votes, 
because different members of the lawmaking body had divergent intents.44 
In fact, we know of no cases where the question has even been asked by the 
lawmaking body or a court. Such a holding would not only be unprecedented, 
it would also be a shock to the lawmakers. We regard this problem as a 
powerful objection to the problem of aggregating intent.45 
 
 44 The absence of any such debate also makes it hard to figure out the requisite consensus for group 
intent because there is no historical experience on which to draw. 
 45 Professor Rick Kay has provided the most sophisticated case for group intent, see Richard S. Kay, 
Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 
82 NW. U. L. REV. 226 (1988), but in our view it still shares the problem that it may result in a body 
purporting to enact an approach but failing to do so. This approach—which might be termed the shared 
intent approach—is based on a more developed theory than many other approaches. Under this view, an 
enactment is validly enacted by a lawmaking body only if the requisite number of legislators needed to 
enact the provision both vote for the provision and share the same intent as to its meaning. Under the 
original constitutional enactment process, which required a majority vote in the state conventions, the 
shared intent approach would require that at least a majority of the delegates to a convention who voted 
for the Constitution share the same intent and that same intent be shared among all of the corresponding 
majorities in the different state conventions that ratified the Constitution. 
 Professor Kay justifies these requirements based on several ideas. First, he argues that the enactors’ 
intent captures what is important about legislation—the will of the lawmaker. Id. at 231–33. In 
determining that will, one looks to those capable of establishing an authoritative rule—that is, the 
lawmaker. Id. That group is limited to the members who vote for the measure because, in Professor Kay’s 
view, the people voting against it do not participate in its enactment. Id. at 247–48. That group also needs 
to be large enough to have authority to enact the measure (if it is to be the lawmaker). Id. at 246–47. 
Finally, he believes that a group’s intent is shared only if all members of the group have the same intent. 
Id. at 247–51. 
 These requirements seem daunting. How could all these people share the same intent? But Professor 
Kay argues that while enactors may often have different intents, those disagreements can be resolved. Id. 
at 248–51. Imagine a constitutional provision that might extend to A or might extend to A and B. Imagine, 
moreover, that half of the group supporting the provision intended A and the other half intended A and B, 
but that neither group is large enough to enact the provision on its own. Professor Kay argues that one 
can treat the two groups as supporting A alone, so long as those in the second group would have intended 
that A be enacted if there was not enough support for A and B. Id. In other words, the second group can 
be added to the first if its intent is to treat A and B as severable. 
 While Professor Kay argues that most members would embrace such an intent to sever, it will 
certainly not always be the case. See id. at 249. People in the second group might feel strongly about a 
provision and not be willing to have it enacted if it only had a narrow interpretation that extended to A. 
In that event, their intent could not be added to those in the first group to support the measure. Thus, 
Professor Kay’s approach does not avoid the problem of a lawmaking body purporting to enact a 
provision but failing to do so because there is not a sufficient sharing of intent—a problem we regard as 
one of overwhelming importance. 
 This problem would both be likely to occur and have serious consequences: many of the ratification 
votes for the Constitution in states—including New York, Virginia, and Massachusetts—were close ones. 
See Ratification Dates and Votes, USCONSTITUTION.NET (last modified Jan. 24, 2010), 
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The third problem involves the ability of lawmakers and interpreters to 
determine the group intent. Even if intentionalists could reach agreement on 
the proper method for aggregating intents, discovering evidence of those 
intents is extremely difficult. Most lawmakers do not explain their votes, and 
those who do may be speaking strategically. Thus, interpreters of the 
enactments will often have a difficult time determining the meaning of a 
provision. Moreover, if the lawmakers themselves cannot easily determine 
the meaning of a provision upon which they are voting, this inability makes 
it all the less likely that they share a common intent with other lawmakers. 
2. A Solution to the Problems of Original Intent: Interpretive Intent 
Given these problems, one might wonder whether the original intent 
approach is a plausible theory of the meaning of laws. In its conventional 
form, we doubt that it is. But an original methods version of the original 
intent approach can avoid these serious problems and provide a relatively 
attractive interpretive theory. 
Under this approach, the constitutional enactors are understood to have 
intended that the Constitution be interpreted in accordance with the existing 
interpretive rules deemed applicable to constitutions. Thus, the meaning of 
the enactment passed is not based on the individual intent of each individual 
enactor. Instead, each enactor intends that the provision have the meaning 
that it would have under the applicable interpretive rules. To put the point 
differently, each enactor has an interpretive intent—he intends that the 
Constitution be interpreted not as he understood it in his own mind, but 
instead in accordance with the applicable interpretive rules. Thus, his 
 
https://usconstitution.net/ratifications.html [https://perma.cc/82UU-FJRJ]. Thus, a small number of 
voters in the majority who had a different and nonseverable intent as to a provision would be enough to 
prevent the ratification vote from being valid in a particular state. Moreover, that failed vote would have 
prevented this state from being part of the Union, even though it was regarded as such by the people. 
What is more, if more than four of the states did not support the Constitution, then the entire Constitution 
would not have been legally ratified because the requisite nine states would not have approved it. 
 This problem is not merely limited to the failure of the Constitution to be enacted. One problem is 
that the ratifiers would not have known the consequences of their actions. Because no one knew about 
this shared meaning approach, the ratifiers would not have realized their intents might cause the failure 
of the Constitution. Put differently, everyone assumed that when a majority of a convention voted for 
ratification, that vote was binding and valid. Imposing a different rule on those people, in the name of 
determining their intent, seems extremely problematic. 
 Another problem with this shared meaning approach is the difficulty of determining what the intended 
meaning was. One must determine how broadly the ratifiers in the thirteen states would have intended 
the provisions to extend. To undertake this task in a serious way appears to be extremely difficult. 
Moreover, for the ratifiers at the time to know the meaning of the provisions they were voting on would 
have been extremely difficult, because it would have depended not only on the unstated intents of their 
own convention, but of the other conventions as well. 
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interpretive intent would replace his substantive intent as to the meaning of 
specific provisions.46 
This approach to original intent avoids the serious infirmities of an 
approach that focuses on the enactors’ intent as to the substantive provisions. 
First, it avoids the need to determine the consensus required to determine the 
group intent as to a substantive provision. Instead, the result of applying the 
interpretive rules to substantive provisions are what the enactors intend. 
Second, the original methods version of original intent also avoids the 
serious problem of a lawmaking body’s failure to enact a valid piece of 
legislation, even though the requisite number of members voted for the 
provision. Since the original methods version does not focus on the enactors’ 
intent as to the substantive provisions, the original methods version will 
avoid the extremely problematic result of an enactment being passed but not 
being validly enacted because the requisite consensus of enactors did not 
share the same intent.47 
Third, the original methods version of original intent also avoids the 
problem of making it difficult for interpreters and legislators to predict the 
meaning of the law. Because original methods originalism employs the 
existing interpretive rules, it uses the traditional interpretive approach, which 
does a good job—especially as compared to alternatives—of indicating the 
meaning of provisions. 
Not only is this approach attractive as matter of theory, it was likely 
embraced as matter of fact. As discussed above, people normally speak 
against a background set of rules of language, including interpretive rules.48 
They generally expect that others understand their words in accordance with 
those rules. Thus, the intended uptake from their words is likely to be that 
produced after applying the interpretive rules. Put differently, they expect 
and intend that their words would be understood in terms of the applicable 
interpretive rules rather than their particular substantive intent about a 
provision, except to the extent that the applicable interpretive rules take that 
substantive intent into account.49 
 
 46 The result of this replacement could in some circumstances result in different constitutional 
meanings. Thus, assume that there was evidence that the Framers (and enactors) intended a provision to 
mean X as a substantive matter. Nevertheless, if the meaning according to existing interpretive rules was 
best interpreted as Y, Y rather than X would be the original meaning of the provision. 
 47 See infra Section II.C.1. 
 48 This argument is strengthened by our argument above that the Constitution is written in the 
language of the law—a language that includes distinctive legal interpretive rules. 
 49 It is possible that interpretive rules would direct the interpreter to consider substantive intent. We 
do not believe that interpretive rules at the time of enactment actually included such a direction. See 
Sections III.B–C.  
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While these background interpretive rules govern all speech, they are 
especially likely to be intended in the context of lawmaking for several 
reasons. First, although people generally rely on interpretive rules, they do 
so in a more consistent and disciplined way in written language than in oral 
statements made in a face-to-face interaction. In the latter situation, other 
sources of information beside the specific words—such as voice inflection, 
facial gestures, and opportunities to clarify—enable the parties to 
communicate the intended message. By contrast, when a writing cannot be 
clarified because the audience is not present, one is likely to apply the 
interpretive rules deemed applicable by the writer and the audience. 
Second, people would be much more likely to rely upon the existing 
interpretive rules when the language is written in a formal document that has 
some official purpose. People normally regard a formal document as 
speaking for itself. Moreover, because formal documents often involve 
matters of importance, it will frequently make sense to attempt to convey the 
information with the precision that shared interpretive rules make possible. 
Third, people would be much more likely to rely upon the interpretive 
rules when a group jointly authors a single writing. If each person’s intent 
matters, but they author a single writing, then the problems of aggregating 
intents provide a strong incentive to use the interpretive rules.50 
Finally, people would be much more likely to rely upon interpretive 
rules when they are writing in a technical area, such as law or medicine. And 
as we have argued extensively above, the Constitution is written in the 
language of the law.51 Law requires such precision because significant harm 
can follow from the failure to communicate precisely.52 Law also can employ 
greater precision because the participants to these communications share the 
knowledge necessary to understand the technical terms and the technical 
interpretive rules.53 
 
 50 People would also be more likely to employ interpretive rules if those rules are regarded as binding. 
If they are binding, then the author and audience have the additional reason of conforming to the norm 
for following the rules. Otherwise, the language of the Constitution would not have the meaning that the 
enactors would have expected it to have. By “binding,” we mean something different than the situation 
that we argue exists in which the originalist interpretive rules are required to be followed because they 
are needed to accurately determine the original meaning of the Constitution. Instead, we mean that the 
original interpretive rules were binding on interpreters not by their determining the original meaning, but 
instead by virtue of their authority as law prior to the Constitution—presumably by virtue of their being 
common law. We do not take a position here on whether the interpretive rules were binding in this sense. 
But if they were, that would be another reason for the enactors to have conformed to them. 
 51 See supra notes 12–19 and accompanying text. 
 52 See, e.g., PETER M. TIERSMA, LEGAL LANGUAGE 112–14 (1999). 
 53 See J. Christopher Rideout & Jill J. Ramsfield, Legal Writing: The View from Within, 61 MERCER 
L. REV. 705, 710 (2009). 
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In the end, the case for concluding that the enactors intended the 
Constitution to be interpreted in accordance with the original interpretive 
rules is very strong. If one had asked the enactors at the time whether they 
expected and intended that the document would be interpreted based on an 
aggregation of subjective intents or the original interpretive rules, we have 
little doubt that they would answer with the latter. In fact, as we discuss 
below,54 there is little evidence that participants during the Bank debate 
stated that their subjective intents should be considered as a legal argument. 
Instead, people applied traditional interpretive rules, based on word 
meanings, structure, and contemporary exposition. 
3. Avoiding Aggregation Problems as to the Original  
Interpretive Rules 
While the original interpretive rules appear to provide a way out of the 
problem of aggregating intents for substantive provisions, one might be 
concerned that it simply relocates the aggregation problem to the level of 
interpretive rules. What happens if one set of enactors intends interpretive 
rule A, another set of enactors intends interpretive rule B, and a third set 
intends interpretive rule C? Would this not create a problem of aggregating 
interpretive intents? 
The kind of interpretive intent for which we argue tempers these 
concerns as well, because the enactors would be intending to follow the rules 
generally deemed applicable at the time, not a set of specific interpretive 
rules. Put differently, if their interpretive intent is to follow the interpretive 
rules properly applied to the Constitution based on practices at the time, then 
the original intent view leads to an objective inquiry resembling that of 
original public meaning—requiring the application of the interpretive rules 
that a knowledgeable and reasonable observer would have applied.55 There 
is no need for aggregation as to specific interpretive rules any more than 
there is a need for aggregation as to specific substantive provisions. 
Many of the same reasons for concluding that the enactors would have 
intended that their interpretive intent be followed also suggest that they 
intended to follow the proper interpretive rules rather than their particular 
beliefs about the interpretive rules. First, applying the proper interpretive 
rules rather than the intended ones helps avoid aggregation problems, which 
are part of the reason for giving priority to interpretive intent in the first 
place.56 Second, people normally communicate against a background set of 
 
 54 See infra Sections III.B–C. 
 55 We discuss how to determine what interpretive rules are appropriately applied to the Constitution. 
See infra Section II.C. 
 56 See infra Section II.C.1. 
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language rules, including the interpretive rules accepted among the 
community of speakers.57 They do not assume that they can determine those 
rules or that their beliefs change those rules if they misunderstand them. 
Finally, people are more likely to rely on an existing set of interpretive rules 
that have an independent content when they are writing a formal document 
and are writing in a technical area, such as law. 
Under this approach, the interpreter must apply the interpretive rules 
that he concludes would have been deemed applicable, based on the existing 
materials, to the Constitution at the time of its enactment. Disagreements at 
the time about the content of interpretive rules would not lead to an 
aggregation issue because they would not be a matter of subjective intent, 
but of the objective evidence. The interpreter would decide, based on the 
evidence from the time, what interpretive rules would have been deemed 
applicable to the Constitution.58 
Given the strength of these arguments, we believe that a strong 
supermajority, not a mere majority, of enactors would embrace an 
interpretive intent for the rules conventionally applicable at the time. Thus, 
under any plausible account of the requisite consensus for group intent, there 
would be sufficient consensus for that intent. We cannot claim that we have 
resolved every conceptual problem with original intent originalism, but we 
do suggest that the original methods version of original intent is the best 
version of original intent available. 
II. DETERMINING THE INTERPRETIVE RULES 
Under original methods originalism, the meaning of a provision is 
determined based in part on the original interpretive rules that would have 
been deemed applicable to the Constitution at the time of its enactment. But, 
this leaves open the question of how one determines what the original 
interpretive rules were. In the previous Section, we argued that there is a 
convergence between the original public meaning and original intent 
approaches. Our argument there relied on claims about what the interpretive 
rules were under different approaches. Here we explore in more depth the 
question of how one determines what the interpretive rules were, especially 
where there are disagreements about the interpretive rules. 
In this Part, we first sketch a theory for determining the content of those 
interpretive rules. We argue that the interpretive rules should be identified 
the same way that people at the time would have determined what those 
 
 57 See, e.g., United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 13 (1994) (noting that Congress must be 
understood to legislate against certain background rules, like the rule that terms are to be given their 
common law meanings unless there are indications to the contrary). 
 58 We provide examples of how to resolve such disagreements below. 
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interpretive rules were. Just as constitutional provisions should be 
interpreted using the interpretive rules that would have been employed at the 
time of the relevant provision’s enactment, so too should the interpretive 
rules be identified based on the methods that would have been employed to 
identify those interpretive rules. We call those methods the meta rules. Thus, 
one uses the meta rules to discover the interpretive rules. By employing the 
meta rules that the people at the time of the Constitution’s enactment would 
have employed to identify the interpretive rules, we stay faithful to the 
constitutional enactors’ decisions about how to interpret the Constitution. 
We also address other issues concerning the meta rules. In particular, 
we discuss the possibility of fundamental disagreements about those rules. 
For example, one possible meta rule is that the interpretive rules are those 
that the enactors intended, while a different meta rule is that the interpretive 
rules are those that would have been embraced by a reasonable and 
knowledgeable person at the time of the Constitution’s enactment. Such 
different meta rules might pick out different interpretive rules, but we argue 
that this divergence between these two meta rules does not occur. The 
intended interpretive rules and reasonably determined interpretive rules 
select the same rules—the conventional interpretive rules at the time. 
We also discuss various aspects of the meta rules, including how they 
determine what evidence to consider and how strong the case for one 
interpretive rule must be. Finally, we provide a more detailed discussion of 
the evolution of constitutional interpretive rules. We argue that such rules 
were common law rules, and therefore, the methods for determining those 
rules would have been common law methods. 
A. Determining the Meaning of Provisions and Determining  
the Interpretive Rules 
In original methods originalism, we determine the meaning of 
provisions by looking at the original interpretive rules that would have been 
deemed applicable to the Constitution at the time of its enactment.59 For 
instance, one interpretive rule determines whether the interpreter should 
select the ordinary meaning of words or the legal meaning of words.60 Thus, 
the interpretive rules provide a rule that governs how to interpret the meaning 
of the constitutional text. 
But our reliance on interpretive rules raises the question of how to 
determine the interpretive rules themselves. In our view, one should follow 
the interpretive rules that would have been applied at the time of the 
 
 59 MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 6, at 117. 
 60 McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 12, at 1344. 
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Constitution’s enactment. This follows directly from the central premise of 
original methods originalism—that to determine the meaning of a document 
one must use the interpretive rules that would have been deemed applicable 
to it.61 In some cases, the applicable interpretive rules will be clear. If the 
Constitution itself provided direction on what interpretive rules to employ, 
then of course one should follow that direction. If there was a consensus at 
the time of the Constitution in favor of certain interpretive rules, then that 
would be extremely strong evidence that those rules would have been 
employed to interpret the Constitution. 
But what if it is uncertain which interpretive rules were applicable? We 
argue that one should use the same methods for determining the applicable 
interpretive rules that people at the time of its enactment would have 
employed. We call these methods for determining the interpretive rules the 
meta rules. Thus, if people at the time would have resolved uncertainty about 
the interpretive rules by, for example, determining what interpretive rules 
applied to the Constitution under the common law, then we should use those 
same meta rules. 
By following the methods that people at the time would have used, we 
stay faithful to the original meaning of the Constitution. People at the time 
would have known that there was uncertainty not only about the Constitution 
itself, but also about how the Constitution would be interpreted. They would 
have expected that both types of uncertainty would be resolved based on the 
then-accepted methods. 
B. The Nature of the Methods for Determining the Interpretive Rules 
The methods for determining the interpretive rules—which we refer to 
as “the meta rules”—are an important ingredient of the original methods 
approach and our argument for the convergence of original intent and 
original public meaning. In this Section, we explore the nature (or some 
general features) of these methods for determining the interpretive rules. 
1. A Comparison of the Meta Rules with the Interpretive Rules 
The meta rules for determining the interpretive rules are similar in many 
ways to the interpretive rules themselves. In both cases, they help us discover 
or determine something—either the meaning of the document or the 
applicable interpretive rules. But there is one significant difference: the rules 
are applied to different objects. In the case of the interpretive rules, those 
rules are applied to enacted law––the constitutional document itself. In the 
case of the rules for determining the interpretive rules, these meta rules are 
 
 61 MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 6, at 117. 
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applied to something else—in our view, to the unwritten law or the 
background rules of the legal system. 
2. Two Salient Meta Rules for Determining the Interpretive Rules 
While one might imagine any number of meta rules for determining the 
interpretive rules, there are two salient approaches to determining the 
interpretive rules: the reasonable import and the interpretive intent 
approaches. Each of these meta rules corresponds to the two principal 
interpretive approaches for interpreting the Constitution: original public 
meaning and original intent. 
Under the reasonable import approach, one looks to how a reasonable 
and knowledgeable person at the time would have determined what the 
applicable interpretive rules were. This rule is similar to the original public 
meaning approach—in that it looks at how a reasonable and knowledgeable 
person at the time would have behaved62—but it differs because it is asking 
what interpretive rules that person would have found and applied. 
In our view, the reasonable import approach ends up applying the 
conventional interpretive rules that would have been deemed applicable to 
the Constitution. A reasonable and knowledgeable person would apply the 
existing rules that were associated with the Constitution. And when those 
conventional rules were uncertain, that reasonable and knowledgeable 
person would apply the methods that would have been applied to resolve 
uncertainty about the interpretive rules. In our view, as discussed below,63 
those methods were the common law methods at the time. 
Under the interpretive intent approach, one looks to the interpretive 
rules the enactors of the Constitution would have intended to apply to the 
document. That is, one looks to determine the interpretive intent of the 
enactors. This rule is similar to the original intent approach, in that it looks 
at how the enactors would have intended their words to be interpreted.64 
In our view, the interpretive intent approach leads to applying the 
conventional interpretive rules for the Constitution. As we have discussed, 
people at the time would have intended to apply the conventional interpretive 
rules for constitutions.65 They would not have sought to have readers 
determine what their subjective intentions were. Our conclusion is based not 
only on the arguments we have already made but also on a review of the 
 
 62 See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 9, at 48. 
 63 See infra Section II.C.2. 
 64 See Richard S. Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional Interpretation, 
103 NW. U. L. REV. 703, 709–10 (2009) (describing how original intent seeks to find the subjective intent 
of the enactors). 
 65 See supra notes 12–14 and accompanying text. 
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ratification conventions. There is no evidence that the ratifiers stated that 
interpreters would consider the ratifiers’ intentions. Instead, the ratifiers 
often referred to the conventional interpretive rules to determine the 
Constitution’s meaning.66 
Moreover, where the conventional interpretive rules were unclear, 
people at the time would have employed the existing conventional approach 
for resolving that uncertainty. In our view, that approach involved the 
common law rules at the time. 
3. Deriving the Interpretive Rules and the Problem of  
Infinite Regress 
We are now in a position to briefly describe how interpretive rules 
might be derived. We have argued that these interpretive rules are derived 
by employing the meta rules at the time. That is, one would apply the meta 
rules that people at the time would have employed for determining what 
interpretive rules to use. 
But what if there was disagreement about the meta rules? There are at 
least two different approaches to the meta rules—the interpretive intent 
approach and the reasonable import approach. If some people believed that 
one of these meta rules was correct and other people believed that the other 
meta rule was correct, how could one resolve the issue? One might be 
tempted to argue that one should resolve the matter with a meta-meta rule—
that is, by considering the approach that people at the time would have 
employed to determine what the meta rules were. But that proposed solution 
might not resolve the issue if people also disagreed about what the meta-
meta rule was. Thus, one might believe there is a serious risk of infinite 
regress. 
While infinite regress is a theoretical possibility, it is not necessarily the 
only outcome. Another possibility is that there is a full convergence—that 
the contending meta approaches lead to the same interpretive rules. In that 
case, the different starting points would end up in the same place. All roads 
would lead to Rome. Not only would there not be an infinite regress: there 
would also be a convergence between the different originalist approaches to 
constitutional interpretation.67 
And, in fact, we believe that this full convergence is the actual result of 
applying the alternative meta rules at the time of the framing. The two salient 
meta rules, reasonable import and interpretive intent, both lead to largely the 
 
 66 See infra notes 149–167 and accompanying text. 
 67 Another possibility is that there is a partial convergence. In this situation, the contending meta 
rules lead to significant overlap between the different approaches. But there would remain some residual 
disagreement. Still, the differences between the approaches would have been reduced. 
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same conclusion: that the conventional rules for interpreting the Constitution 
should be followed. Moreover, if there is disagreement about what the 
applicable conventional interpretive rules were, both meta rules require that 
they be resolved based on the common law at the time. Thus, despite the 
theoretical possibility of infinite regress, there is in fact a single result as to 
the original interpretive rules: a convergence as to the conventional 
interpretive rules.68 
4. Aspects of the Meta Rules 
In this Section, we briefly discuss three aspects of the meta rules: what 
evidence to consult, the amount of evidence needed to establish an 
interpretive rule, and the different types of evidence that are relevant. 
One important category of meta rules are those that indicate what 
evidence to consult in determining the interpretive rules. The two rules we 
discussed above require different evidence to be consulted. The reasonable 
import rule requires the interpreter to consider evidence of the interpretive 
rules that a reasonable and knowledgeable observer would have employed. 
The interpretive intent approach attempts to ascertain what interpretive rules 
the enactors intended to be applied. 
Another type of meta rule would involve the amount of evidence 
required to determine the existence of an interpretive rule. We have argued 
that there was a 51%-to-49% rule for determining the meaning of 
constitutional provisions.69 Under this rule, one would choose the 
interpretation that has the greater degree of support, even if two contending 
interpretations are both strong.70 Similarly, we believe it was likely there was 
a 51%-to-49% rule for determining the correct interpretive rule.71 Under this 
meta rule, an interpretive rule should be followed if there is just slightly more 
evidence supporting it than the alternative interpretive rule. Thus, we do not 
believe that it is necessary to have a consensus before following an 
interpretive rule any more than it is necessary to have a consensus on the 
meaning of a word in the Constitution before following the better attested 
meaning. In the case of either a word or a rule, a consensus, of course, should 
be followed, but in the absence of a consensus one should follow the better 
view. 
A final issue worth mentioning here involves the different kinds of 
evidence that are part of the inquiry as to what the interpretive rules were. 
One type of evidence involves the background rules for determining what 
 
 68 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Constraints, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 975, 990 (2009). 
 69 MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 6, at 142. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
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the interpretive rules were. For example, we argue below that the Founders’ 
generation would have considered the common law method for determining 
the interpretive rules.72 
Another type of evidence turns on an examination of the Constitution. 
Perhaps the principal dispute between the Jeffersonians and the Federalists 
was the type of document the Constitution was. The Jeffersonians argued it 
was essentially a compact or treaty between the states, and therefore, the 
existing interpretive rule that applied to treaties, which narrowly construed 
grants of state sovereignty, should be applied.73 The Federalists, by contrast, 
contended that the Constitution was the fundamental law of the people.74 
Therefore, they believed that the conventional rules did not allow for that 
interpretive rule to be applied. Thus, this disagreement between the 
Jeffersonians and the Federalists was not about whether the conventional 
interpretive rules applied, but what type of document the Constitution was. 
This latter issue was to be decided largely based on an examination of the 
Constitution itself. 
C. Our Preliminary View of the Emergence and Content of  
the Original Interpretive Rules 
Our discussion in this Part has explained how one would determine 
what the interpretive rules are. But our discussion has proceeded at an 
abstract level, discussing the meta interpretive rules and how they should 
function. While we believe the abstractness of the discussion is appropriate, 
we also believe that, in explaining our approach, it would be helpful to 
examine the matter from a more concrete perspective that takes into account 
the actual history and institutions involved. Here, then, we discuss how we 
believe the process actually operated to form the original interpretive rules. 
Of course, it is not possible for us to fully describe or defend our account of 
the process, but that is not the point of the discussion. Instead, it is to more 
fully describe the process so as to communicate how it worked. 
Our basic point here is to show how the people at the time would have 
thought of the conventional interpretive rules and how that understanding 
would have led them to resolve disagreements about those rules. We argue 
that the constitutional interpretive rules grew out of the statutory interpretive 
rules that existed in England during the eighteenth century. Those statutory 
interpretive rules were understood as common law rules. The constitutional 
interpretive rules largely followed those statutory interpretive rules as 
 
 72 See infra notes 92–95 and accompanying text. 
 73 H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885,  
927–30 (1985). 
 74 Rozann Rothman, The Ambiguity of American Federal Theory, 8 PUBLIUS 103, 109 (1978). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1396 
applied to the special circumstances of constitutions—first the state 
constitutions and then the Federal Constitution. Significantly, then, in 
determining what the conventional interpretive rules for the Constitution 
were, and for resolving disagreements about those rules, we believe that the 
traditional common law method as applied to discovering the interpretive 
rules should be employed. 
1. The Development of the Constitutional Interpretive Rules 
The original interpretive rules for the Constitution grew out of the 
statutory interpretive rules in England and in the colonies in the eighteenth 
century.75 The interpretive rules of the time were generally those, in 
Blackstone’s Commentaries and other places, that sought the meaning of the 
statute based on its intent as expressed in the text understood in context.76 
As Blackstone indicates, maxims of interpretation generally were 
common law rules.77 The rules were not enacted by statute, but instead were 
based on the customs and practices of the courts when interpreting statutes. 
While these statutory interpretive rules were common law rules, we believe 
that they contributed to the meaning of the statute. When a statute was 
enacted, it had the meaning that the statutory interpretive rules at the time as 
applied to the statute would have yielded. While it is possible that the 
common law interpretive rules would have changed over time, the meaning 
of the statute would not have, because it would be given the meaning as of 
the time of its enactment.78 
When the Colonies declared independence in 1776, they began the 
process of enacting constitutions. Thus, the question arose—What 
interpretive rules should be applied to these new state constitutions? While 
a full exploration of this matter has yet to be written, we believe that it is 
clear that the new state constitutions were understood to be interpreted 
 
 75 Robert G. Natelson, The Founders’ Hermeneutic: The Real Original Understanding of Original 
Intent, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1239, 1246, 1252 (2007); see also Powell, supra note 73, at 914–16. 
 76 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 59–61 (George Sharswood ed., J.B. Lippincott 1893). 
 77 Id. at 67. 
 78 Our position here differs significantly from that of Professors William Baude and Stephen Sachs. 
We agree with them that the English statutory interpretive rules were common law rules. But we believe 
that the interpretive rules established a fixed meaning of the statute that the common law should not have 
been able to modify, even if the statutory interpretive rules changed. This understanding is the only one 
that conforms to the idea that the statutes take priority over the common law. Under the contrary view, 
the common law could modify the meaning of statutes. Professors Baude and Sachs, by contrast, believe 
that the meaning was controlled by the statutory interpretive rules and therefore if those rules changed, 
the meaning of the statute would change. William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 
130 HARV. L. REV. 1079, 1140 (2017). That said, they do believe that changes in the common law rules 
should not, as a matter of common law, apply retrospectively to statutes enacted prior to  
those changes. Id. 
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primarily in accord with the statutory interpretive rules, because courts 
regularly applied such rules to cases concerning state constitutions.79 
It is not surprising that statutory interpretive rules would have been 
applied to the constitutions, because the constitutions were so similar to the 
statutes enacted by Parliament and the state legislatures. Both statutes and 
constitutions were enacted by a representative and deliberative body, 
established law that was binding on the government and the public, and were 
to be interpreted by judges.80 
It is true that the constitutions were enactments of a particular kind that 
might differ from statutes in certain respects. And therefore, it is possible 
that the interpretive rules governing the constitutions might, at times, diverge 
from the statutory interpretive rules. In our view, one can divide the 
constitutional interpretive rules into three categories. First, some of the 
constitutional interpretive rules were identical to the rules that applied to 
statutes.81 Second, some of the constitutional interpretive rules were statutory 
interpretive rules, but rules that only applied to certain types of statutes. For 
example, the constitutions were relatively short documents––they were not 
codes. Hence, Chief Justice John Marshall’s statement that it is a 
Constitution we are interpreting, not a code,82 was merely an application of 
the statutory interpretive rules for interpreting a statute based on its length 
and level of detail.83 
The third category involves constitutional interpretive rules that are 
distinct from statutory interpretive rules. These interpretive rules are not 
applied to any type of statute. Thus, in these cases, it is hard to treat the 
 
 79 McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 12, at 1383. 
 80 Another similarity is that statutes in England and constitutions in the United States were deemed 
to be enacted by the sovereign––the King-in-Parliament in England and the people in the United States. 
See Natelson, supra note 75, at 1252. Of course, many Americans rejected the Blackstonian view that the 
King-in-Parliament had sovereign authority. See John V. Jezierski, Parliament or People: James Wilson 
and Blackstone on the Nature and Location of Sovereignty, 32 J. HIST. IDEAS 95, 102 (1971). 
 81 For example, both statutory and constitutional interpretive rules would have followed Blackstone’s 
rule that the meaning of the enactment was to be sought initially based on the words of the enactment. 
See BLACKSTONE, supra note 76, at 59. 
 82 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819). Chief Justice Marshall’s rule had 
been applied by others at the time of the Constitution, including by Edmund Randolph. See infra notes 
111–113. 
 83 For another example, as discussed below, the Federal Constitution used a system of enumerated 
powers that differed from the approach employed by state constitutions. Thus, Attorney General Edmund 
Randolph believed that a stricter approach should be employed to finding implied powers of the federal 
government. See infra note 115 and accompanying text. As discussed earlier, one might simply see this 
as the application of the traditional statutory and constitutional interpretive rules applied to an instrument 
that was written differently––having an enumerated powers structure––but some might view this as a 
distinct federal constitutional interpretive rule. 
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constitutional interpretive rule as a species of a statutory interpretive rule. 
Instead, it makes sense to describe it as distinctively constitutional. 
In this situation, the constitutional interpretive rules get their content by 
applying the existing common law approach. Under the common law, one 
would look to existing practices to determine what rules to apply.84 One 
would start with the closest analogy to the constitution to determine the 
interpretive rules. And since statutes were so similar to constitutions, the 
common law would largely apply the statutory interpretive rules to 
constitutions. But if the constitution were different enough from statutes in 
some respect, it would make sense to apply a distinctive interpretive rule to 
the constitution. Thus, whether there was a distinctive constitutional 
interpretive rule and its particular content would be determined based on the 
common law method. 
As a means of exploring this third category of distinctively 
constitutional interpretive rules, we can discuss several rules that might fall 
into this category. First, one can imagine a situation where statutes were 
understood as documents written in the language of the law, but constitutions 
were understood as written in ordinary language. The constitutional 
interpretive rules would then, in contrast to the statutory interpretive rules, 
interpret the constitutional language as ordinary language. 
Second, one can imagine applying an interpretive rule for treaties to the 
Constitution that was not applied to statutes. In his Bank Speech, James 
Madison referenced the rule that the meaning of the parties to the instrument 
is a proper guide to its meaning, which was a traditional rule of treaty 
interpretation.85 Madison appeared to believe that in certain respects the 
Constitution was more like a treaty than a statute.86 
Third, one can imagine applying the contemporary exposition rule, 
which was a traditional statutory interpretive rule, to the Constitution in a 
different way than it may have applied to statutes. Under the traditional rule, 
interpretations of the statute by certain authoritative people were deemed 
relevant evidence as to the meaning of the statute.87 Under what appears to 
be the majority view, the legislative history of one of the houses was not 
deemed to fall under this rule.88 By contrast, there is some evidence, which 
is discussed below, that when a ratifying convention as a whole proposed an 
 
 84 More generally, the common law approach would look to precedent, custom, and reason. See infra 
note 92 and accompanying text (discussing the common law as based on precedent, custom, and reason). 
 85 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1896 (1791) (remarks of Rep. James Madison). 
 86 For further discussion, see infra note 122 and accompanying text. 
 87 See infra Section III.C. 
 88 Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial Deference to Executive Interpretation, 126 YALE L.J. 908, 
935–36 (2017). 
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amendment to the Constitution, that proposal might be understood as an 
interpretation of the document by a body with official duties. Thus, it would 
be treated as a contemporary exposition of the document.89 
One can see how each of these rules might be applied to constitutions 
even though they were not applied to statutes. But while they are potentially 
applicable, we have strong doubts, especially as to the first two, that they 
represent distinctive constitutional interpretive rules that applied to the 
Constitution. First, we reject that the first and second of these rules were 
actual constitutional interpretive rules. We have shown in other work that the 
Constitution was written in the language of the law and therefore an ordinary 
language interpretive rule is inappropriate.90 Moreover, we also believe that 
Madison’s application of a treaty interpretive rule was not properly applied 
to the Constitution and in the early years was a distinctively minority view.91 
Second, it is not clear to us that the first and the third of these rules 
actually represent distinctive constitutional interpretive rules rather than the 
application of the statutory interpretive rules to statutes or enactments of a 
particular kind. The contemporary exposition rule, as applied to the state 
ratifying conventions, is arguably merely the application of the existing rule 
to different circumstances, not a different interpretive rule. And the ordinary 
language interpretive rule is arguably merely an application of the more 
general interpretive rule that a document should be interpreted based on the 
language in which it was written. 
But even if one regards these rules as distinct constitutional interpretive 
rules, the only one that we believe has strong evidence that it actually would 
have been properly applied to the Constitution is the contemporary 
exposition rule. Thus, there may be distinctive constitutional interpretive 
rules, but they are likely––as we argue below––of limited significance. 
2. How Uncertainties About the Interpretive Rules Would  
Have Been Resolved 
We are now in a position to understand how issues about the 
interpretive rules would have been understood at the time. We address this 
first in terms of the legal materials—that is, by looking at the legal materials 
 
 89 It is not clear why the ratification convention would have been treated differently from the 
legislative house. One possible reason is that the convention was making an up-or-down decision on a 
constitution that was already written. By contrast, a legislative house would normally be writing 
legislation or, if it received a bill from the other house, could propose an amendment to the bill. Thus, the 
convention was more in the position of an early executive or judicial official who was implementing a 
law he could not modify. 
 90 See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 12, at 1368–1400 (amassing evidence that the Constitution 
is written in the language of the law). 
 91 See infra note 122 and accompanying text. 
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that people at the time would have considered when determining the 
common law in a specific area. Then, we move on to how the original public 
meaning and original intent approaches would apply these legal materials. 
It is useful to examine how the legal materials would have been 
employed at the time because interpreters would have applied the 
interpretive rules that had been applied to statutes and the state constitutions 
to the Federal Constitution. 
To the extent that those interpretive rules were unclear—if, for 
example, there was uncertainty about whether an interpretive rule was 
applicable—the interpreters would have decided the matter as they would 
have decided any other question that was addressed by the common law—
by reference to precedent, to custom, and to the reason of the law.92 First, 
they would have looked to the prior decisions of the courts on this question, 
considering both the number of decisions adopting a position as well as the 
reputations of the judges and courts that took the position. Second, they 
would have looked to customs and practices. This would have included 
reference to statements made by legislators and those learned in the law when 
interpreting statutes and constitutions. Third, they would have looked to the 
reason of the law. This would include a variety of matters, including 
practices and decisions in analogous areas as well as judgments about the 
results of applying different rules as assessed by the existing values of the 
society.93 
It is important to stress that the interpretive rules that would have 
applied to the Constitution—whether or not they were deemed also to be 
common law rules—would have been the rules that existed at the time of the 
Constitution’s enactment. Thus, in determining what interpretive rules were 
applied to the Constitution, an interpreter would not look to later decisions 
(except to the extent that they cast light on the earlier rules) and would not 
look to rules of the society at later times. If the interpreter were to do that, 
they would not be employing the interpretive rules at the time, but 
interpretive rules that developed later.94 
 
 92 BLACKSTONE, supra note 76, at 67, 69–70; Caleb Nelson, A Critical Guide to Erie Railroad Co. 
v. Tompkins, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 921, 931–935 (2013) (discussing the traditional common law as 
consisting of custom, reason, and precedent). 
 93 Nelson, supra note 92, at 934. 
 94 See Mike Rappaport, When Common Law Rights are Constitutionalized, LAW & LIBERTY  
(Oct. 29, 2014), https://www.lawliberty.org/2014/10/29/when-common-law-rights-are-constitutionalized 
[https://perma.cc/YCN8-QYNR]. In deciding what the interpretive rules were, we claim that the 
interpreters would use the common law method. But we have argued that there is good reason to believe 
that the constitutional interpretive rules would not be common law rules. So, the question arises why the 
interpreters would use the common law method. While we discuss this issue in a different article, the 
short answer is the interpreter will be determining the content of the formerly common law rules as of the 
time of the Constitution’s enactment. The content of that rule will need to be discerned by common law 
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This discussion has described how interpreters would use the legal 
materials to determine the interpretive rules that applied to the Constitution. 
We can now move to the original public meaning and original intent 
approaches for determining the interpretive rules. Under the original public 
meaning approach, one looks to how a reasonable and knowledgeable person 
at the time would have answered the question. Such a hypothetical person 
would look to the legal interpretive rules that the common law would have 
applied to statutes and the state constitutions and then would apply them, 
with such adjustments as the common law indicated, to the Constitution. 
The original intent approach reaches much the same conclusion. Under 
the original intent approach, because the enactors would have intended for 
the Constitution to be interpreted using legal interpretive rules, one would 
look to the conventional methods for determining the interpretive rules for a 
constitution.95 Those methods were the common law methods for 
determining the interpretive rules for a constitution. As with the original 
public meaning approach, the original intent approach looks to the common 
law as the guide to applying the statutory and state constitutional interpretive 
rules to the Constitution. 
Thus, we conclude that the original intent and original public meaning 
approaches to constitutional interpretation would both direct interpreters to 
follow the conventional rules applicable at the time. We also suggest that 
methods were available to determine the appropriate content of those rules. 
We now turn to illustrate how these methods work in practice and how the 
conventional rules at the time enjoyed substantial consensus even among 
those who disagreed on substantive constitutional questions. 
III. ILLUSTRATING LEGAL INTERPRETIVE RULES 
This Part examines questions about specific interpretive rules—both the 
rules for interpretation and the meta rules for determining the interpretive 
rules. Within the space provided for this Essay, we cannot definitively 
defend any proposition dependent on historical evidence, but we can 
illustrate our suggested methods for resolving such questions. We focus on 
evidence from the early debate over the Bank of the United States, the most 
contested constitutional issue in the years immediately after the ratification 
 
methods. Just as an interpreter will need to consider the previously common law characteristics of a 
common law rule incorporated into the Constitution, such as the Confrontation Clause, so must the 
interpreter consider those previous common law characteristics of an interpretive rule assumed by the 
Constitution. Under this approach, the content of the rule will be discerned through common law methods 
as of the date of the Constitution’s enactment. But those common law methods will not be used to consider 
subsequent values and circumstances, since that would be discovering a new common law rule. 
 95 See supra Section I.C.2. 
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of the Constitution. We then supplement that evidence with that offered by 
prior scholarship—both by others and by ourselves. 
This Part suggests, even if it does not prove, two important propositions 
about how to find the content of the interpretive rules. First, there was 
substantial agreement that the Constitution was to be interpreted according 
to conventional interpretive rules. Second, while some have argued that there 
was great disagreement on the rules to be applied,96 we find substantial 
consensus. And even if there was some disagreement about particular 
interpretive rules, it occurred within a broader consensus of how to determine 
what the interpretive rules were. 
Then, we illustrate how to evaluate whether some methods of legal 
interpretation were or were not accepted as conventional rules. In particular, 
we argue it was not a conventional rule to determine the meaning of the 
Constitution through the substantive intent of the Philadelphia Convention.97 
Moreover, the better view is that it was not the conventional rule to determine 
the meaning of the Constitution through the substantive intent of members 
of state ratifying conventions. On the other hand, it is possible that inferences 
from the actions formally taken by a state ratifying convention as a whole 
provided evidence of what the Constitution meant, because these actions 
represented early expositions of its meaning—itself a long-standing 
conventional interpretive rule. But that rule is very different from looking at 
the substantive intent of the enactors. It is not evidence of intent but evidence 
of the meaning of the Constitution’s text. And it is only one interpretive rule 
among many and thus only one factor in determining textual meaning. 
The debate about passing a bill authorizing the Bank of the United 
States provides an important window into the content of the original 
methods.98 It occurred immediately after the Constitution was enacted, and 
thus the debate most likely captured the conventional methods of 
interpretation deemed applicable at the time of the Constitution’s 
enactment—the relevant time period for interpreting the original 
Constitution and the Bill of Rights. It engaged a wide spectrum of opinion, 
pitting nationalists, who saw the Bank as essential to sustaining a flourishing 
 
 96 Kurt T. Lash, Originalism All the Way Down?, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 149, 154 (2015) (reviewing 
JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD CONSTITUTION (2013)). 
 97 By substantive intent, we mean the intent of the Framers or, in the case of the state conventions, 
the ratifiers as to the meaning of substantive provisions of the Constitution. That intent is normally 
accessed through the legislative history of the respective conventions. 
 98 Professor Lee Strang has used these same debates to cast doubt on the claim that constitutional 
construction, as opposed to interpretation, was a conventional approach at the time of the Constitution’s 
enactment. See Lee J. Strang, An Evaluation of Historical Evidence for Constitutional Construction from 
the First Congress’ Debate over the Constitutionality of the First Bank of the United States, 14 U. ST. 
THOMAS L.J. 193, 202, 206 (2018). 
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republic, against those more interested in preserving state power, which they 
saw as closer to the people and less liable to corruption than national 
institutions, like the Bank. It occurred under the most intense public scrutiny 
of any constitutional issue in the Early Republic.99 It sustained attention from 
some of the most important political and legal thinkers of the time, including 
James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, and Edmund 
Randolph.100 What is remarkable is that, despite their political disagreements, 
we can gather a fair amount of consensus on important interpretive issues. 
This is particularly the case when we emphasize the contributions of 
Hamilton and Randolph, who, as practicing lawyers, could be expected to 
best recognize what rules were deemed applicable to a document written in 
the language of the law. 
This last Part builds on our prior work on the language of the law, which 
also discussed how to find the conventional interpretive rules. That work 
canvassed debates over the Constitution in both courts and Congress and 
found the application of familiar canons of interpretation.101 We also 
concluded that Federalists and Antifederalists did not disagree so much on 
the positive questions of what conventional interpretive rules of 
interpretation would be applied, but rather on the normative question of 
whether that application was desirable.102 
A. Following Conventional Interpretive Rules 
The Bank debate displays a consensus that the Constitution was to be 
interpreted in accordance with the conventional interpretive rules.103 The 
rules deemed applicable were the rules applied to documents that were 
thought analogous to a federal constitution, like a statute or a state 
constitution. Legal analysis at the time suggested that such rules might 
sometimes be modified in light of the differences between the Constitution 
and the analogous documents.104 
Hamilton’s opinion was most explicit on the obligation to employ 
established rules. He stated that the intention of the Constitution “is to be 
 
 99 Id. at 200. 
 100 See discussion infra Section III.A. 
 101 McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 12, at 1393–96. 
 102 Id. at 1399. 
 103 We are not the only scholars to observe this agreement. See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL 
INTENT AND THE FRAMERS’ CONSTITUTION 10 (1988) (“The one point on which nearly everyone agreed, 
during the [1791] [B]ank controversy, was that the Constitution should be construed according to 
conventional rules of interpretation.”). 
 104 See infra notes 110–114 and accompanying text. 
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sought for in the instrument itself, according to the usual and established 
rules of construction.”105 
In his opinion on the Bank, Jefferson also did not question the 
application of conventional rules to the Constitution.106 He, in fact, applied a 
rule of interpretation, the rule against surplusage, as the fulcrum of his 
argument that permitting a constitutional power of incorporation would 
require such a liberal construction of federal powers as to make the 
enumeration superfluous. And he introduced this rule by touting it as 
“established.”107 
In debates over the Bank in Congress, participants often based their 
arguments on conventional rules. Elbridge Gerry, a Representative from 
Massachusetts and a former member of the Philadelphia Convention, is the 
most explicit in stating that conventional interpretative rules should be 
followed.108 Gerry lays out each of Blackstone’s rules for statutory 
interpretation before applying the rule to the question of the Bank’s 
constitutionality.109 Gerry’s approach is particularly significant, because, 
although Gerry supported the Bank, he was an Antifederalist who in fact had 
refused to sign the Constitution. Yet, like the Federalist Hamilton, he too 
believed in interpreting the Constitution according to the conventional rules. 
In his opinion on the Bank, Randolph is less explicit about the relevance 
of conventional interpretive rules, but he did implicitly try to follow 
conventional rules of interpretation as adapted to a new kind of document—
the Federal Constitution. He compared the Federal Constitution to two types 
of enactments—legislative enactments and state constitutions—both 
documents with conventional legal interpretive rules. He then determined 
how to apply these rules to the Federal Constitution by considerations that 
would adapt them better to capture the Constitution’s meaning. In his 
comparison of a constitution to a statutory enactment, Randolph stated: 
There is a real difference between the rule of interpretation, applied to a law and 
a constitution. The one comprises a summary of matter, for the detail of which 
numberless laws will be necessary; the other is the very detail. The one is, 
 
 105 Opinion of Alexander Hamilton, on the Constitutionality of a National Bank (Feb. 23, 1791), in 
LEGISLATIVE AND DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 95, 101 (M. St. Clair 
Clarke & D. A. Hall eds., Augustus M. Kelley 1967) (1832) [hereinafter BANK HISTORY]  
(emphasis added). 
 106 Opinion of Thomas Jefferson, Secretary of State, on the Same Subject (Feb. 15, 1791), in BANK 
HISTORY, supra note 105, at 91–92. 
 107 Id. As we note below, Jefferson also does appeal to the Framers’ intent, but this is not the principal 
basis of his argument, and he does not declare it is an established rule. Id. 
 108 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1946 (1791) (remarks of Rep. Elbridge Gerry). 
 109 Id. at 1946–50. 
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therefore, to be construed with a discreet liberality, the other, with a closer 
adherence to the literal meaning.110 
Randolph thus compared a constitution to a statute,111 but suggested that the 
conventional rules should be applied with the recognition of the difference 
between a detailed statutory code and a constitution. Indeed, despite 
concluding that congressional authorization of a national bank was 
unconstitutional, he recognized that the difference in the amount of detail 
included in a provision should make a difference in the interpretive rule, 
much like Chief Justice Marshall’s famous position in McCulloch v. 
Maryland.112 The Constitution is to be interpreted much like a statute, but 
because it is not a detailed code, allowances in interpretation must be made 
for the lesser amount of detail in its expression.113 Hamilton agreed with this 
aspect of Randolph’s position, further supporting the idea that this was the 
adaptation of a conventional rule.114 
Randolph then compared the Federal Constitution to a state 
constitution, but again suggested that the rules should be applied to the 
Federal Constitution with recognition of an important feature of the Federal 
Constitution. He stated: “But, when we compare the modes of construing a 
State and the Federal constitution, we are admonished to be stricter with 
regard to the latter, because there is a greater danger of error in defining 
partial, than general powers.”115 In other words, because the limitations 
imposed on the federal government by the enumerated powers must be 
preserved, focusing only on the difference in the amount of detail in the 
respective enactments ignores the salience of enumeration and may 
misconstrue the Constitution’s meaning. Hamilton disagreed with Randolph 
on this point. While he did not respond directly to Randolph’s interpretive 
observation, he emphasized another difference that he saw between federal 
 
 110 Opinion of Edmund Randolph, Attorney General of the United States, to President Washington 
(Feb. 12, 1791), in BANK HISTORY, supra note 105, at 86–87. 
 111 Samuel Chase, another well-known lawyer and future Supreme Court Justice, had made the same 
comparison in a case a year earlier. See Donaldson v. Harvey, 3 H. & McH. 12, 19 (Md. 1790) (“In 
expounding the [F]ederal [C]onstitution, the same rules will be observed which are attended to in the 
exposition of a statute.”). 
 112 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (“[I]t is a constitution we are expounding.”). 
 113 Id. On the proper interpretation of Marshall’s statement, see John O. McGinnis & Michael B. 
Rappaport, The Abstract Meaning Fallacy, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 737, 761. 
 114 Opinion of Alexander Hamilton, on the Constitutionality of a National Bank, supra note 105, at 
99. We address elsewhere Hamilton’s apparent objection to use of certain conventional rules of 
interpretation. See MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 6, at 128 n.51. 
 115 Opinion of Edmund Randolph, Attorney General of the United States, to President Washington, 
supra note 110, at 87. 
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and state constitutions, namely that the government created by the former 
faces greater crises.116 
Disagreement between Hamilton and Randolph on how to apply 
conventional interpretive rules should not detract from their agreement on 
the method of discovering rules. They both begin with the conventional 
interpretive rules for analogous enactments and reason, in a common law 
method, about the degree to which they should be modified in being applied 
to the Federal Constitution. Indeed, it is likely that their greatest 
disagreement was not a disagreement about the nature of the rules, but of 
fact—whether the power of incorporation was so substantial that it would 
have been expressly mentioned if it had been given. 
Madison also proceeded as if there were applicable conventional 
interpretive rules. Indeed, before engaging in specific legal analysis he lists 
five rules, which he describes as “preliminaries to a right interpretation”: 
An interpretation that destroys the very characteristic of the Government 
cannot be just. 
Where a meaning is clear, the consequences, whatever they may be, are to 
be admitted—where doubtful, it is fairly triable by its consequences. 
In controverted cases, the meaning of the parties to the instrument, if to be 
collected by reasonable evidence, is a proper guide. 
Contemporary and concurrent expositions are a reasonable evidence of the 
meaning of the parties. 
In admitting or rejecting a constructive authority, not only the degree  
of its incidentality to an express authority is to be regarded, but the degree of its 
importance also; since on this will depend the probability or improbability of 
its being left to construction.117 
All of Madison’s rules are either conventional or derived from either a 
conventional rule or drafting considerations applied to a constitution. Three 
of the rules Madison applies were conventional.118 And another can be 
 
 116 Opinion of Alexander Hamilton, on the Constitutionality of a National Bank, supra note 105, at 
99 (“But the reason of the rule forbids such a distinction. This reason is, the variety and extent of public 
exigencies, a far greater proportion of which, and of a far more critical kind, are objects of national, than 
of State administration. The greater danger of error, as far as it is supposeable, may be a prudential reason 
for caution in practice, but it cannot be a rule of restrictive interpretation.”). 
 117 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1896 (1791). 
 118 For instance, Madison’s first rule—that an interpretation that destroys a characteristic of 
government cannot be just—flows directly from the rule ut res magis valeat, quam pereat, i.e., that one 
should not interpret an enactment to void its essence. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 76, at 89. As applied 
to the Federal Constitution, one of whose essential structures was the enumerated powers, it meant that 
an interpreter had to avoid a gloss that destroyed those limitations. Madison’s third rule of consulting the 
meaning of the parties, if reasonable, is recommended in EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 
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derived from a conventional rule.119 His last—roughly, the more important 
the power the more likely it is to be expressed—is similar to Randolph’s 
structural consideration in interpreting the Constitution to give weight to its 
enumerated powers. It reflects the conventional view that great, as opposed 
to incidental, powers in charters of corporations or government would be 
expressly stated.120 
The most important point is that even though Madison was not a 
practicing lawyer121 and his views on conventional legal rules might be 
accordingly somewhat discounted, he appeared generally, like all other 
participants in the Bank debate, to be relying on the best adaptation of what 
he views as conventional rules to find the Constitution’s meaning on a 
difficult question. 
But Madison did appear to be something of an outlier. At times, with 
his references to “the parties,” Madison appears to consider the interpretation 
of treaties in addition to statutes as a good analogy for the Constitution in 
determining the content of the conventional rules.122 Moreover, he 
sometimes does not simply parrot conventional rules but rather restates them, 
as with his first and last rule, in a way that applies them directly to the 
Constitution.123 Gerry criticized this approach, arguing that “as they are not 
sanctioned by law exposition, or approved by experienced judges of the law, 
they cannot be considered as a criterion” for interpretation.124 For Gerry, as 
we have seen, directly applying Blackstone’s express conventional rules for 
statutory interpretation remains the best guide. 
Beyond the Bank bill, there is very substantial evidence that interpreters 
at the time believed that the Constitution should be interpreted according to 
 
§ 270, at 247 (Abraham Small 1817), as a rule for interpreting treaties. Madison’s fourth rule of consulting 
contemporary interpretation applies to interpreting treaties, id. § 272, at 248–49, and statutes alike.  
See Bamzai, supra note 88, at 933–35 (collecting references to the canon of contemporaneous exposition). 
 119 The provenance of Madison’s rule about an unclear provision being “triable by its consequences” 
is somewhat less clear. But Madison’s use of the term “consequence” later in his speech may make the 
relation of his statement to conventional rules clearer. There, he argues that if the Bank were permitted 
to be incorporated, the government could incorporate a whole range of institutions, leading to unlimited 
power. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1897 (1791). That consequence would be inconsistent with the enumerated 
powers. Thus, an interpreter “tries consequences” by considering whether the consequences are consistent 
with the structure of the Constitution. 
 120 See William Baude, Rethinking the Federal Eminent Domain Power, 122 YALE L.J. 1738, 1751 
(2013) (practice confirmed that “great powers” were not included within those powers granted by the 
Necessary and Proper Clause). 
 121 See Mary Sarah Bilder, James Madison, Law Student and Demi-lawyer, 28 LAW & HIST. REV. 
389, 389–91 (2010). 
 122 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1896 (1791). 
 123 Id. 
 124 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1946 (1791) (remarks of Rep. Gerry). Gerry then relied on rules of 
Blackstone. See id. at 1946–50. 
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conventional rules. Professor Jefferson Powell showed that applying 
conventional rules was the method of interpreting legal enactments in the 
English legal system that formed the legal background of the American 
constitutional system.125 He also extended his analysis to show that in famous 
constitutional debates in the Early Republic, including those involving the 
Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, the constitutional interpreters embraced 
what they believed to be the conventional rules.126 In our work, we have 
shown that both Supreme Court Justices and members of Congress, many of 
whom were not jurists, regularly applied conventional rules to interpret the 
Constitution.127 Even many of those who have disagreed with Professor 
Powell about the nature of the rules applied to the Constitution have followed 
this approach of considering what were the conventional rules applied to 
enactments and how early interpreters adapted them to the Constitution.128 
In later debates about the Constitution, people agreed that conventional 
rules should be applied, even as the issue of the appropriate legal analogy to 
the Constitution was more sharply joined. After the debate over the Bank 
bill, Jeffersonians began to dispute what had previously been the 
predominant analogy of statutes and state constitutions by expressly 
suggesting that the Constitution resembled a compact or treaty among 
nations.129 This characterization of the Union allowed Jeffersonians to 
employ the traditional common law interpretive rule that grants of powers 
by a sovereign should be narrowly construed. This was the basis of their 
argument in a wide range of disputes—arguing for the Virginia and 
Kentucky Resolutions,130 against the capacity of individuals to sue states in 
federal court,131 and against the constitutionality of the Bank of the United 
States when that dispute reached the Supreme Court.132 
The Federalists opposed the characterization of the Constitution as a 
compact. Most famously, Chief Justice Marshall argued that the Constitution 
was a delegation of authority from the people of the United States to the 
national government.133 But, even if one believes, as we do, that the 
Federalists had the better of the analogy and that the Jeffersonians were 
innovating, this kind of debate remains consistent with the consensus in favor 
 
 125 See Powell, supra note 73, at 896–98. 
 126 Id. at 926–31. 
 127 See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 12, at 1381–94. 
 128 This is true for instance of Professor Robert Natelson, see infra note 148 and accompanying text. 
 129 Powell, supra note 73, at 926–28. 
 130 Id. 
 131 McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 12, at 1388. 
 132 See David S. Schwartz, Misreading McCulloch v. Maryland, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1,  
17–18 (2015). 
 133 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403 (1819). 
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of following conventional rules. Jeffersonians and Federalists were arguing 
about what interpretive rules were relevant, and that question depended on 
the nature of the document in question. Moreover, a variety of conventional 
rules applied to both compacts and statutes, with the result that even 
Jeffersonians and Federalists were not in systematic disagreement on which 
rules to apply.134 
B. The Substantive Intent of the Philadelphia Convention  
Was Not a Conventional Rule 
There is very substantial evidence that supports the proposition that an 
approach appealing to the substantive intent of the Framers as constitutive of 
the Constitution’s meaning was not a conventional interpretive rule. Both 
Hamilton and Randolph agreed that appeals to the legislative history of the 
Philadelphia Convention were not an acceptable method. Madison’s speech 
also did not include it among his rules for interpretation. Jefferson was the 
only outlier, and even he did not deploy the Framers’ intent as the mainspring 
of his argument. 
Hamilton expressly contrasted a view of following substantive intent 
with the established rules of construction: 
 
 134 The evidence in the Bank debate and other evidence we have previously canvassed does not 
support those scholars, like Professor Caleb Nelson, who argue that that there can be no legal conclusion 
reached on what is the basic approach to applying conventional legal interpretive rules. See Caleb Nelson, 
Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 576 (2003) (“[W]e have identified 
early support for at least four different approaches to constitutional interpretation: (1) reading the 
Constitution as a layman might, (2) deriving special canons of construction from the Constitution’s unique 
nature and purpose, (3) borrowing preexisting rules for the interpretation of statutes, and (4) borrowing 
preexisting rules for the interpretation of treaties or compacts.”). First, all the participants in the Bank 
debate appealed to legal interpretive rules, and thus, they did not read the Constitution as a layman might. 
See supra notes 104–114 and accompanying text. Second, as we have discussed above, the key analogy 
was to conventional rules interpreting statutes and occasionally to what may be regarded as 
superstatutes—state constitutions. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. While Madison seemed to 
suggest an analogy to treaties and compacts, his was a unique perspective in the Bank bill debate. See 
supra note 125 and accompanying text. Although this analogy subsequently became more popular with 
Democratic-Republicans, later views should be discounted in favor of earlier ones. We also find little 
support for “special canons of construction” derived from the Constitution’s unique nature, although we 
do not rule out that there be some such rules in addition to those conventional rules applied typically to 
statutes. While, as we have noted, some participants in the Bank debate did take account of the 
Constitution’s salient features, see supra notes 110 and 116 and accompanying text, like the relative 
amount of detail in the Constitution, such considerations helped apply conventional rules in a way that 
captured the meaning of the document. 
 Our disagreement stems from our interpretive theory as well as from the evidence. Some scholars 
decline to reach a legal conclusion on what interpretive rules should be applied once they have shown 
that the historical record contains different approaches or different rules. Nelson, supra, at 576. For 
reasons we have discussed, see supra note 68 and accompanying text, we think the correct meta rule is to 
choose the interpretive rules better represented in the historical record. 
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The Secretary of State will not deny, that, whatever may have been the intention 
of the framers of a constitution, or of a law, that intention is to be sought for in 
the instrument itself, according to the usual and established rules of 
construction. Nothing is more common than for laws to express and effect more 
or less than was intended.135 
And note that Hamilton made this statement in a confident manner that 
suggested no fear of substantial contrary evidence. 
Gerry also rejected reference to the Framers’ intent both implicitly and 
explicitly: implicitly, by arguing for interpretation according to Blackstone’s 
rules; explicitly, by rejecting reliance on subjective intent.136 
Randolph also disavowed the Framers’ intent:  
An appeal has been also made by the enemies of the bill to what passed in the 
federal convention on the subject. But ought not the constitution to be decided 
on by the import of its own expressions? What may not be the consequence if 
an almost unknown history should govern the construction?137 
The import of its own expressions, in fact, roughly captures what we 
moderns might call public meaning originalism. It is particularly significant 
that Hamilton and Randolph, preeminent lawyers of their day, agree in 
dismissing substantive intent while disagreeing about the ultimate question 
of the constitutionality of the Bank. 
Madison himself did not include reference to subjective intent in any of 
the five rules discussed above—rules that he describes as “preliminaries to a 
right interpretation.”138 While he does refer to a decision of the convention 
to reject a charter for the canal, he simply calls it an “impression,” and it does 
not form part of his legal analysis.139 Moreover, when two members of 
Congress argued that Madison’s impression of the Federal Convention had 
no legal relevance,140 Madison was conspicuously silent about this criticism 
 
 135 Opinion of Alexander Hamilton, on the Constitutionality of a National Bank, supra note 105, at 
101 (emphasis added). 
 136 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1952–53 (1791). 
 137 Edmund Randolph, Attorney General’s Opinion: No. 2 (Feb. 12, 1791), in BANK HISTORY, supra 
note 105, at 89–90. 
 138 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1896 (1791) (remarks of Rep. Madison). 
 139 Id. (“In making these remarks on the merits of the bill, he had reserved to himself the right to 
deny the authority of Congress to pass it. He had entertained this opinion from the date of the Constitution. 
His impression might, perhaps, be the stronger, because he well recollected that a power to grant charters 
of incorporation had been proposed in the General Convention and rejected.”). 
 140 Id. at 1952 (remarks of Rep. Gerry) (“The gentleman from Virginia [Madison] has endeavored to 
support his interpretation of the Constitution by the sense of the Federal Convention; but how is this to 
be obtained? By applying proper rules of interpretation? If so, the sense of the Convention is in favor of 
the bill; or are we to depend on the memory of the gentleman for a history of their debates, and from 
thence to collect their sense? This would be improper . . . .”); id. at 1955 (remarks of Rep. John Vining) 
(“[B]ut granting that the opinion of the gentleman from Virginia had been the full sense of the members 
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in a rebuttal speech that contested other points.141 Thus, his statement about 
the sentiment of the Philadelphia Convention is best viewed as one of 
personal opinion not relevant to legal interpretation, thus implicitly 
supporting the legal views of Hamilton and Randolph.142 
Jefferson did appeal to the intent of the Philadelphia Convention—to its 
rejection of a power of incorporation in connection with building canals, 
which was the appeal that Hamilton rejected as impermissible in his own 
opinion.143 But Jefferson was the outlier on this issue—not supported by any 
of the other major disputants on the Bank, not even by Randolph or Madison, 
who agreed with his ultimate position. And even Jefferson did not make this 
his principal argument. Instead, his main contention was one rooted in a 
traditional rule of interpretation, that of antisurplusage: interpreting the 
Constitution so loosely as to give it the implied power would treat the 
enumeration of powers as redundant.144 
Other evidence also supports the view that consulting the legislative 
history of the Philadelphia Convention was not deemed a rule of 
interpretation at the time of the Constitution. Previous scholarship has 
provided substantial argument that consulting the substantive intent of the 
enacting legislature was not done.145 While sometimes the term intent was 
used, this use was a legal term of art that signified the intent of the document 
to be gleaned from its words and its objective purpose, not the subjective 
 
of the Convention, their opinion at that day, he observed, is not a sufficient authority by which for 
Congress at the present time to construe the Constitution.”). The only other Congressman to have 
referenced the proceedings of the Federal Convention also deprecated their relevance in favor of 
interpreting the Constitution according to “general principles.” Id. at 1929 (remarks of Rep. William 
Smith). 
 141 See id. at 1956–60 (remarks of Rep. Madison). 
 142 Moreover, when a member of the House attempted to argue that the House’s responsibilities for 
treaties could be ascertained by reference to arguments from the proceedings of the Convention, James 
Madison himself rejected this appeal, stating that he “did not believe a single instance could be cited in 
which the sense of the Convention had been required or admitted as material in any Constitutional 
question.” 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 776 (1796) (remarks of Rep. Madison). Thus, it appears that this incident 
confirms our view that Madison’s reference to the Philadelphia Convention was not part of his legal 
analysis and more generally that it was a not a generally accepted rule to refer to the legislative history of 
the Philadelphia Convention. 
 143 Opinion of Thomas Jefferson, Secretary of State, on the Same Subject, supra note 106, at 92 (“It 
is known that the very power now proposed as a means, was rejected as an end by the convention which 
formed the constitution . . . .”). 
 144 Id. (“It is an established rule of construction, where a phrase will bear either of two meanings, to 
give it that which will allow some meaning to the other parts of the instrument, and not that which would 
render all others useless. Certainly no such universal power was meant to be given to them. It was intended 
to lace them up straitly within the enumerated powers; and those without which, as means, those powers 
could not be carried into effect.”). 
 145 See Powell, supra note 73. 
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intent of the drafters.146 Sometimes interpreters did refer to the spirit of the 
document, but as Blackstone’s gloss on this interpretative rule shows, 
reference to spirit authorizes a resort to the objective purpose or cause of the 
legislation, not the subjective intent contained in its legislative history.147 The 
practice of jurists in the Early Republic was similar. They did not generally 
focus on the legislative history of the Philadelphia Convention, even as they 
applied other conventional interpretive rules.148 
C. The Substantive Intent of the Ratifiers Was Not a  
Conventional Interpretive Rule 
The debate over the Bank also does not support the notion that it was a 
conventional rule to consider the substantive intent of participants at state 
conventions as constitutive of the meaning of the Constitution. Instead, the 
debate suggests that material from the ratifying conventions had at most a 
more limited role. First, material from state conventions was used as a 
 
 146 Id. at 895 (“[T]he ‘intent’ of the maker of a legal document and the ‘intent’ of the document itself 
were one and the same; ‘intent’ did not depend upon the subjective purposes of the author.”). 
 147 See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 76, at 91 n.37. Chief Justice Marshall referred to this as a rule of 
interpreting the statute against the mischief it was designed to eliminate. See Robert Lowry Clinton, 
Classical Legal Naturalism and the Politics of John Marshall’s Constitutional Jurisprudence,  
33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 935, 959 (2000) (citing Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 
(4 Wheat.) 518, 628–29 (1819) (“[S]ince the clause in the constitution must in construction receive some 
limitation, it may be confined, and ought to be confined, to cases of this description; to cases within the 
mischief it was intended to remedy.”)). 
 148 We recognize that Professor Robert Natelson has argued in favor of substantive intent as an 
interpretive rule at the time of the enactment of the Constitution. See Natelson, supra note 75. We do not 
have space to describe fully our grounds of disagreement. But we believe that he often fails to recognize 
that the terms “intent” and “spirit” were used not to mean subjective intent but rather something more 
akin to objective intent or purpose, as Professor Jefferson Powell and others have noted, see Powell, supra 
note 73, at 895. Second, some of his evidence comes from long before the Framing, when subjective 
intent may have been used, but closer to the time of the Framing, text began to supersede subjective intent 
as to the source of objective meaning. See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 
101 COLUM. L. REV 1, 52–54, 85–102 (2001). And we think there are substantial problems with his 
evidence for the use of legislative history closer in time to the Framing. For instance, he relies 
substantially on arguments of attorneys, see Natelson, supra note 75, at 1266–68, 1267 nn.149–52, but if 
these claims are not reflected in jurists’ opinions, they may as easily cut against the acceptance of 
subjective intent as a conventional interpretive rule. And most of the judges writing for a majority that 
Professor Natelson quotes as referring to parliamentary debates mention these records for reasons other 
than to find the meaning of a statute. See, e.g., R v. Pasmore (1789) 100 Eng. Rep. 531 (KB) (referring 
to comments in Parliament to determine preexisting law); Savage v. Smith (1776) 96 Eng. Rep. 650, 650 
(CP) (referring to the Lords’ Journal to determine the enactment date of a statute). Finally, the weight of 
modern commentators who have studied this issue is against Professor Natelson’s view. See, e.g., Bamzai, 
supra note 88, at 935–36 (arguing, as the most recent source, that reference to subjective intent was a 
minority view). And we would add that Professor Bamzai shows that even these references were instances 
of the contemporary interpretation of a text. Id. at 935–37. That is, jurists did not resort to subjective 
intent to define what the meaning of a statute is but rather only as one rule of evidence for  
what a text meant. 
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contemporary interpretation of the text of the Constitution proposed by the 
Federal Convention. Thus, it was not a canvassing of intent but of evidence 
about the interpretation of a text laid down by others. Second, it was one rule 
among many of evidence about the text and thus only one factor in 
interpretation. Finally, only formal actions of an entire convention, like the 
passage of proposed amendments, not individual comments of the ratifiers, 
had substantial support as to contemporary interpretation. 
During the debate over the Bank, Madison elaborated most on how 
material from the convention might be used. As noted above, Madison’s 
speech stated that in interpreting the Constitution, “[c]ontemporary and 
concurrent expositions are a reasonable evidence of the meaning of the 
parties.”149 He then discussed three kinds of “contemporary expositions.”150 
First, he said that “[t]he explanations in the State Conventions all turned on 
the same fundamental principle, and on the principle that the terms necessary 
and proper gave no additional powers to those enumerated.”151 Madison thus 
thought this proposition to be universally embraced. He then quoted “sundry 
passages” from speakers who supported this position at the conventions.152 
Second, he noted that the explanatory declarations and amendments of the 
Conventions were to the same effect.153 Third, he claimed that the 
amendments proposed and ratified by the states, i.e., the provisions we now 
know as the Bill of Rights, “proceeded on a rule of construction, excluding 
the latitude now contended for.”154 
Thus, Madison himself provided powerful confirmation that he did not 
believe that the Constitution was constituted by the substantive intent of the 
ratifying conventions. Not only did he label these materials contemporary 
expositions of a text already written, he sees exposition at the ratifying 
conventions as similar in kind to inferences from what we now know as the 
Bill of Rights. These references to the Bill of Rights could hardly represent 
expressions of substantive intent, rather than evidence of what a text meant, 
because the Constitution had already been enacted at the time the 
amendments were proposed in Congress. 
But even this use of material from conventions may have been 
something of an innovation, even if one that arguably flowed from a 
conventional rule. While the use of contemporary interpretation was a 
 
 149 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1896 (1791). 
 150 Id. at 1901. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. 
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conventional rule known by writers like Sir Edward Coke,155 the majority 
view was that this referred to interpretations of statutes already enacted, not 
to interpretations in the process of being enacted.156 Thus, Madison’s use 
again shows how interpreters at the time attempted to adapt conventional 
rules to the new circumstances of the Constitution—in this case of a text 
proposed by one convention and then ratified by another set of conventions 
that provided an opportunity for exposition of the text given by the first 
convention.157 
Hamilton’s opinion also used inferences from actions at the ratifying 
convention as a mode of interpretation to support his view that Congress was 
understood to have the constitutional power to create companies so long as 
these were not monopolies. He stated:  
It is remarkable that the State conventions who had proposed amendments in 
relation to this point, have, most, if not all of them, expressed themselves nearly 
thus: Congress shall not grant monopolies, nor erect any company with 
exclusive advantages of commerce! Thus, at the same time expressing their 
sense, that the power to erect trading companies, or corporations, was inherent 
in Congress, and objecting to it no further than as to the grant of exclusive 
privileges.158 
The best way to understand Hamilton’s position is that he thought inferences 
from amendments and declarations of an entire convention were 
contemporary expositions of the Constitution to be treated as evidence of its 
meaning. He cannot have seen them as expressions of substantive intent, 
because he, as we have seen, expressly rejected substantive intent.159 
Randolph also addressed the use of evidence from a convention to 
interpret the Constitution. He clearly opposed using statements from 
particular ratifiers as contemporary expositions. He stated: 
The opinions too of several respectable characters have been cited, as delivered 
in the state conventions. As these have no authoritative influence, so ought it to 
be remembered, that observations were uttered by the advocates of the 
 
 155 See supra note 118 and accompanying text (citing secondary literature describing support for this 
rule, including statements of Coke). 
 156 Bamzai, supra note 88, at 935–36. 
 157 See supra note 89 (discussing reason why the ratifying conventions might have been treated 
differently than legislative houses for purposes of contemporary exposition). 
 158 Opinion of Alexander Hamilton, on the Constitutionality of a National Bank, supra note 105, at 
111. 
 159 See supra note 135 and accompanying text. Professor Charles Lofgren sees this statement as 
reliance on intent rather than contemporary exposition. See Charles A. Lofgren, The Original 
Understanding of Original Intent?, 5 CONST. COMMENT. 77, 112 (1988). We think Professor Lofgren is 
wrong because he fails to distinguish subjective intent from contemporary exposition, which is a general 
problem with his article’s analysis. 
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constitution, before its adoption, to which they will not, and, in many cases, 
ought not to adhere.160 
Randolph seems to be trying to distinguish official—in his words, 
“authoritative”—actions, like resolutions of a convention, which might have 
weight as contemporary expositions, from mere private opinions, which do 
not have interpretive weight. Thus, it appears that Randolph would have 
probably agreed with Hamilton that inferences from the official actions of a 
whole convention might be considered as contemporary exposition of the 
Constitution. 
Thus, what emerges from the Bank debate is a rejection of relying on 
evidence of substantive intent from the state conventions to help determine 
the meaning of the Constitution. Instead, to the extent that evidence from the 
conventions was relevant, it appeared to count as contemporary exposition 
of the Constitution. One can divide the circumstances when such evidence 
might be relevant into three categories. First, the contemporary exposition 
might be contained in an action endorsed by the convention as a whole. The 
evidence appears strong that such interpretations were considered relevant.161 
But because the conventions took relatively few collective actions beyond 
assenting to the Constitution, as a practical matter their contribution to 
contemporaneous exposition is likely to be modest. 
Second, the contemporary exposition might be contained in isolated 
statements by particular delegates to the ratifying conventions. Here, the 
evidence again appears strong that such individual statements would not 
have been deemed relevant.162 Finally, the contemporary exposition might 
represent a large number of statements made by delegates to the conventions 
that all took the same position. Here, the evidence is mixed as to whether 
such statements would have been considered relevant.163 
 
 160 Opinion of Edmund Randolph, Attorney General of the United States, to President Washington, 
supra note 110, at 90. 
 161 Both Hamilton and Madison relied on interpretations in these circumstances. See supra notes 89, 
149–154, 158–159. Randolph’s argument that statements by persons with no authoritative influence 
should not count also suggests the inference that he would have thought an official statement by a 
convention as a whole would have been relevant. See supra note 110. 
 162 Randolph maintained that such statements were not entitled to weight. See supra note 160. 
Madison’s reliance on official actions of the conventions as well as a large number of statements that 
were universally embraced also suggests the possibility that he would have distinguished isolated 
statements by particular delegates. See supra notes 149–154. Hamilton’s reliance on only the official 
actions of the convention and his failure to discuss isolated statements is also consistent with his rejection 
of the relevance of these isolated statements. See supra notes 158–159. 
 163 Here Randolph argued these statements were not entitled to weight, see supra note 160, but 
Madison disagreed. See supra notes 110, 149–154. Hamilton did not address the issue. See supra note 
105. 
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The evidence from the Bank debates provides confirmation of what one 
would conclude for other reasons. First, as discussed above, there was no 
tradition of relying on the statements of legislators from legislative history 
in the sovereign parliament as constitutive of the meaning of a statute or 
much evidence of relying on it as a contemporary exposition of meaning.164 
It would thus have been odd to resort to legislative history of conventions for 
interpreting the meaning of the text, even assuming that the state conventions 
were the sovereign enactors of the Constitution. Second, there were thirteen 
separate state conventions.165 Even beyond the aggregation problem of 
finding the intent of a multimember body, discussed above,166 finding the 
intent of the state conventions would raise the even more difficult problem 
of aggregating the state conventions. 
Third, it counts as some evidence that no enactor said that it was their 
intent that mattered to interpretation. Instead, those at the Convention 
behaved as if what mattered was the language of the text that they were to 
ratify. When they debated the meaning of the text, they debated it as if the 
meaning was already fixed and something to be clarified through resort to 
conventional rules of interpretation.167 They were thus acting self-
consciously as contemporary interpreters of text—which is the way Madison 
himself understood them. 
Our understanding of the use of statements from the ratifying 
conventions is even consistent with a much later statement of Madison’s 
sometimes wrongly deployed as support for the relevance of  
substantive intent: 
 
 164 See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
 165 See Akhil Reed Amar, Our Forgotten Constitution: A Bicentennial Comment, 97 YALE L.J. 281, 
284 (1987). 
 166 See supra Section I.C.3. 
 167 See, e.g., Patrick Henry, Remarks at the Virginia Convention (June 20, 1788), available at 
https://consource.org/document/journal-notes-of-the-virginia-ratification-convention-proceedings-1788-
6-20 [https://perma.cc/TNM8-UY6Z] (complaining that a clause of the Constitution about jury trials is 
written in technical terms that poor people will not understand); George Mason, Remarks at the Virginia 
Convention (June 17, 1788), available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/ 
a1_9_1s14.html [https://perma.cc/ET96-HPZ3] (arguing against Edmund Randolph that ex post facto 
clause should be interpreted as ordinary language); Phanuel Bishop, Remarks at the Massachusetts 
Convention (Jan. 16, 1788), available at https://consource.org/document/newspaper-report-of-
massachusetts-ratification-convention-debates-1788-1-16 [https://perma.cc/K6AZ-V7LN] (noting that 
the clause providing congressional authority over state elections would have been written differently if 
the Framers had intended to control state elections only if states failed in their duty to run them); Thomas 
McKean, Remarks at the Pennsylvania Convention, (Nov. 28, 1787), available at https:// 
consource.org/document/jasper-yeates-notes-of-the-pennsylvania-ratification-convention-1787-11-28 
[https://perma.cc/BKD7-FJZ9] (applying the canon of expressio unius to explicate meaning of Congress’s 
powers under the Constitution). 
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[T]he legitimate meaning of the Instrument must be derived from the text itself; 
or if a key is to be sought elsewhere, it must be not in the opinions or intentions 
of the Body which planned [and] proposed the Constitution, but in the sense 
attached to it by the people in their respective State Conventions where it 
rec[eived] all the authority which it possesses.168 
Madison does not say the intent of ratifiers is relevant. While he rejects 
using the intent of the Philadelphia Convention, what is relevant from the 
state conventions is the “sense attached to it by the people.”169 And the 
exposition contemplated seems to be collective, that of “the people,” which 
is likely collected in the actions of the whole convention, like proposed 
amendments or declarations or at least the substantially universal sentiments 
reflected there. Nor does he say that this exposition is definitive. Instead, it 
is “a key,” not “the key,” to unlock disputed meanings.170 It comports with 
his rule on contemporary expositions annunciated three decades before—one 
factor in reaching the correct interpretation of text.171 
One implication of the lack of support by either the Framers or ratifiers 
for the use of substantive intent is an indirect argument for interpretive intent. 
That is, assuming that one believes that intent is the right way to give 
meaning to the Constitution, the lack of support for substantive intent makes 
interpretive intent the more likely method by which those creating the 
Constitution would have given this intuition effect. 
But even more importantly, our analysis shows how we can investigate 
the historical record to determine whether originalism should embrace a 
particular method. It is not that one will always have complete confidence in 
the content of a rule, any more than one will have complete confidence in 
the meaning of a word or provision in the Constitution, but the same process 
of sifting patiently through history will allow one to reach a view as to what 
is the better view.172 
 
 168 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Ritchie (Sept. 15, 1821), reprinted in 3 THE RECORDS OF 
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 447–48 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) (emphasis added). 
 169 Id. 
 170 Id. 
 171 See supra notes 117, 149–154 and accompanying text. 
 172 After this Essay was first submitted, The Second Creation: Fixing the American Constitution in 
the Founding Era by Professor Jonathan Gienapp was published. JONATHAN GIENAPP, THE SECOND 
CREATION: FIXING THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION IN THE FOUNDING ERA (2018). The basic argument of 
the book is that the Constitution of 1789 was “uncertain,” see id. at 9, and “incomplete,” see id. at 215, 
and that those who debated its meaning in the Early Republic self-consciously exercised discretion in its 
interpretation. It includes a chapter titled “The Rules of the Constitution,” which discusses the debate 
over the Bank of the United States. Id. at 202–47. In this chapter, Professor Gienapp argues that advocates 
and opponents of the Bank approached constitutional interpretation in fundamentally different ways. Id. 
Some thought the Constitution could not be “reduced to a set of rules.” Id. at 225. Others thought that 
that boundaries of the Constitution did set determinate rules. Id. Given the space limitations and timing, 
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CONCLUSION 
The debate over original intent and original public meaning has 
launched scores of law review articles. In this Essay, we propose the basis of 
a truce rooted in the original interpretive rules. The best versions of original 
meaning and original intent rely on these rules as they would be understood 
by a legally informed observer at the time they are enacted. As a result, the 
content of these rules would be similar, if not the same. The famous debate 
over the Bank of the United States provides substantial evidence that it was 
common ground to interpret the Constitution according to the conventional 
rules. It also offers confidence that historical analysis allows us to discover 





it is beyond our capacity to respond fully, but we have two brief observations on this chapter that are 
connected to our own focus on the extent that there was agreement on a set of interpretive rules. 
 First, Professor Gienapp draws inferences from arguments of participants to make assertions that 
advocates and opponents of the Bank differed on the content and existence of legal interpretive rules. See, 
e.g., id. at 214. But he does not systematically canvass the use of legal interpretive rules in the Bank 
debate, as we do in this Essay, and thus fails to recognize the substantial convergence among participants 
on interpretive rules to fix the meaning of the Constitution. This failure prevents Professor Gienapp from 
seeing that their principled differences may not have been so much on the nature of the rules or the 
discretion needed to interpret the Constitution but how to apply the rules to the facts. For instance, even 
if participants largely agreed on the rules, they could and did disagree on how important a power it was 
to create a national bank and thus how likely that power was to have been included in the text rather 
merely than implied. If that was the case, then differences on the constitutionality of the Bank would have 
been just an instance of disagreement about a particular issue—a commonplace of original scholarship. 
 Second, in our view, Professor Gienapp does not persuasively show that the Bank advocates thought 
they had discretion over the meaning of the constitutional text or over the appropriate rules to be applied. 
The alternative view is that advocates simply thought that the Constitution gave Congress broad authority 
to implement enumerated objectives within a meaning that was nevertheless fixed. This view is 
compatible with the assertions of the Bank advocates that he quotes. See, e.g., id. at 214–15 (comments 
of Theodore Sedgwick and Elbridge Gerry). It was the view embodied in Chief Justice Marshall’s defense 
of the Bank. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 113, at 761. In other words, the broad authority 
reflected the fixed meaning of the Constitution. It did not emerge through the discretion of the interpreters. 
 
